bout de papier, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2001) — Summer 2001 // Été 2001, pp. 42–44
THE SCIENCE OF WAR: CANADIAN
SCIENTISTS AND ALLIED MILITARY
TECHNOLOGY DURING THE SECOND
WORLD WAR, Donald H. Avery, Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1998. 406 pp.
Few scientists begin their careers intending to facilitate death and destruction. Their interests are generally life-affirming and yet, as Donald Avery shows so ably, when called upon, Canadian scientists turned their energy and creative talents to the instruments of war. That most of their efforts were directed towards the creation of defensive weaponry makes their activities more palatable; that some of their contributions were less clearly detensive is another matter. In the latter phases of the war, Canadian scientists joined their American and British allies in the production of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, it is through this collaboration that Canadian science was transformed. There is a certain ambivalence inherent in this story: unimaginable advances occurred in some areas and careers were made by wartime contributions — but at what cost? Warfare is a dirty business; to his credit, Avery neither condemns nor glorifies these scientists. Moral assessments are left to the reader.
Avery’s view of Canada’s place in the Allied triumvirate is more judgmental. His Canadians are a hard-working honest crew, oftentimes manipulated by Americans and Britons alike. The British are depicted as arrogant and short-sighted; the Americans are depicted as having both know-how and ability. There are several examples of how this unequal relationship manifested itself within the Canadian scientific environment which was part of the broader Allied defense effort, but the emergence of the Montreal Lab and the Chalk River nuclear plant as part of the Allied nuclear research program is perhaps most symptomatic of the three-way arrangements characterized by bullying and cajolery, as well as by mutual respect and cooperation. During the 1940s, the Canadians were important, but nonetheless expendable, participants.
Although there are several books on the British, the Manhattan Project, and the creation of the atomic bomb, Avery shows how Canadian scientists factored into this World War II episode. Until 1942, the British believed that their work in nuclear physics was superior to that of the United States and that they were entitled to take charge in this area. In 1941, Churchill brusquely rebuffed Roosevelt’s offer to collaborate; the Americans responded in kind. When it became clear to the British that only the Americans had both the financial means and the technological ability to build the bomb, they had to find a way to gain access to American research. This was going to be difficult since the Americans had decided to strike out on their own; to this end $400 million was allocated for the Manhattan Project (which eventually cost x$2 billion). The British belatedly recognized their error, but only a circuitous route would allow them to participate in atomic research. They could establish a presence in Canada and facilities such as the Montreal Lab (1942) and the Chalk River nuclear plant (1945) consequently emerged. Canadians were thus caught up in the Anglo-American dispute because Canada was seen by the British as providing access to US research while the Americans saw Canadian collaboration as key to their ability to produce uranium oxide. Equally important from the US perspective was the fact that Canadian research facilities would provide a diplomatic solution to their desire to keep Britons out of their labs.
The Canadian focus of Avery’s book is refreshing, and a number of home-grown figures loom large. None is more prominent than C.J. Mackenzie, the director of the National Research Council. A scientist with political savvy, Mackenzie was aware that the Americans and the British were “prepared to use Canada as a pawn in their scientific chess game” (186), and he and other Canadian scientists attempted to use that fact for their own purposes. As a result, they were willing participants in this game. Men such as Frederick Banting, whose death in 1941 cut short his participation in the war effort but who nonetheless provided inspiration and direction to others; Otto Maass, a chemist from McGill University who directed biological and chemical research undertaken at the Experimental Station at Suffield, Alberta, and at the War Disease Control Station at Grosse Île, Quebec; and George Wright, a chemist at the forefront of explosives research, are just a few of the most prominent Canadian participants. Mindful of the international context of this story, Avery devotes considerable attention to others as well. For example, Vannevar Bush, director of US defense science; James Conant, second in command to Bush at the Office of Scientific Research and Development; and Henry Tizard, British representative and scientific advisor, figure prominently. What is even more astounding are Avery’s revelations about the extent to which the scientific community rallied behind the war effort: “By 1943, the National Research Council alone had a scientific staff of 1,300, with hundreds of other university scientists carrying on war related research.” (25) This group also included graduate students who were specifically seconded to military science in order to keep them off the front lines in Europe. (132) The rationale was that their abilities could be put to better use in the lab than in battle, and that their expertise would be needed when life returned to normal after the war. Both graduate and postgraduate scientists worked on biological and chemical weaponry, on radar and radio communications, as well as on non-nuclear explosives and ballistics. Undoubtedly all of these men were compelled by a sense of duty, and although most beavered away in anonymity, the war nonetheless offered unanticipated career opportunities. Indeed, several scientists were transformed: once obscurely engaged in esoteric research in university or government labs, practical achievements in military science catapulted some to stardom.
Despite the transformation which occurred in Canadian science, it would be misleading to assume that the Canadian scientific efforts were on par with the other Allies. The subordinate and supporting role played by Canada was in part due to Anglo-American competitiveness and, ironically, this competitiveness probably saved countless Canadian scientists from the worst excesses of paranoia over security. Towards the end of the war anti-Soviet sentiments were common, but it appears that relatively few Canadian scientists were prosecuted under the War Measures Act (for violating the Official Secrets Act) because both the US and Britain were loath to risk sharing top secret information with them. The Canadians were just too casual about security. For example, in February 1944, a scientist from Suffield, en route to meetings on chemical warfare, lost top-secret documents in a Chicago railway station. (210) In addition to being rather cavalier about security, many scientists/ academics were oblivious to the implications of working in a secure environment. Neither training nor disposition prepared them for such work. It was only after the RCMP raids and “spy trials” of 1946 and 1947 that many recognized the gravity of their situation.
In the last two chapters of Science of War Avery examines the issue of science and security — always an interesting topic. Revelations and analyses of breaches of security are commonplace in military history, but the topic is interesting because military science is fundamentally different from science in a nonmilitary context. Civilian science is based on transparency rather than secrecy. Admittedly there is a proprietary element to any scientific activity, but scientists doing “pure” (nonmilitary) research prefer to present and publish their findings so as to receive credit from both the public and their peers. Similarly, in the commercial context, disclosure may be delayed, but it is nonetheless an important factor in ensuring profits (through patenting discoveries/inventions). Science in the military is a different matter, and as Avery points out, it was especially difficult to convince Canadians that security was important: there was, he notes, “a tendency of many scientists to view security procedures and classification systems as arbitrary and bureaucratic, with little or no relevance to the scientific or military value of the information.” (207) Moreover, and for good reason, many Canadians saw the Soviets as allies in the fight against fascism rather than as enemies trying to abscond with classified documents.
Ironically, the Soviets shared much the same view of Canada as did the British: it was a convenient place from which to tap into US science. All parties involved were well aware of the Soviet view but so long as the Soviets were needed to defeat fascism the situation was ignored. The Americans nevertheless saw the “Soviet threat” as requiring a high level of security, and Canadian security against Soviet infiltration were deemed inadequate. Avery puts forward his most contentious argument here: he suggests that the prosecution of Canadian scientists, while not affecting a large number of people, was part of a larger plan to ensure military control over atomic energy. Scientists were accused of espionage and a number were incarcerated. Avery’s examination of their experiences is convincing evidence that scientists were easy targets. Their actions were used to show that civilians could not be trusted with something as sensitive as nuclear energy. Again his metaphor of the chess game seems relevant.
Avery’s book is a detailed analysis of how the Canadian scientific community, in collaboration with their British and US counterparts, rallied to the Allied cause in World War II.
There is much new and fascinating information; the emphasis on Canada is also a welcome approach. Brief biographical entries on many of the scientists are contained in an Appendix, as is a chronology of the “major military, political, and scientific events.” There are copious notes and an impressive bibliography both of which highlight what is perhaps the greatest strength of the book – the comparative approach. It is refreshing to read a book which takes the reader beyond national boundaries. So appropriate to a study of science, itself an avenue of enquiry which revels in its internationalism.
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Originally published in bout de papier, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2001) — Summer 2001 // Été 2001, pp. 42–44. Read the rest of this issue →
