

bout de papier

Vol. 21, No. 1

From Nihon to Nasser

Herbert Norman's Diplomacy
During the Suez Crisis

Canada and the World


Provoking discussion on
Andrew Cohen's *While Canada Slept*

Libya
*A Journey Inside
the Jamahiriya*



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
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

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

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
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If this issue of **bout de papier** doesn't start a couple of corridor debates, I'm not sure what would. Perhaps the most controversial of the articles we present in this issue is one which encompasses four takes on **Andrew Cohen's** provocative book *While Canada Slept*, and his tough views of the effectiveness — or not — of Canadian diplomacy in recent years. Trenchant rebuttals are offered by former Ambassador **John Noble** and current Ambassador (to Afghanistan) **Christopher Alexander**, as well as by Foreign Affairs Deputy Minister **Peter Harder** — and an equally trenchant 'rebuttal to the rebuttals' is offered by Andrew Cohen.

Unsurprisingly, Messrs Noble, Alexander and Harder question the substance of Mr. Cohen's argument — that Canada has lost its status as a premier diplomatic player in the world, mostly through a starving of resources to foreign-affairs related departments and agencies. All three point to considerable achievements made by Canadian diplomacy in recent years as evidence that we are neither asleep nor helpless. My own view is that Mr. Cohen's criticism may not be so much incorrect as premature. The points made by his critics are largely valid, but in part it is because we are still able to benefit from an internationalist outlook and departmental structure that is being eroded by current circumstances — one of the examples I would use is the undermining of a professional foreign service. The full damage of these changes is not yet fully apparent, but if, as they say on election night, current trends continue, we might want to start buying some of that black crêpe with which Mr. Cohen has already started to adorn Canada's efforts to project itself abroad through foreign policy writ large.

This is not a defence of a traditional, hidebound foreign service that views itself as the centre of the foreign policy universe. Those that say that the domestic clients of foreign service are expanding in range, and that we must respond to that broadening client base (and their own capacities) are, of course, quite right. But Mr. Cohen is correct when he says that the garrotting of resources aimed at a foreign service that has the skills, knowledge and flexibility to ably represent Canada broad will maim this effectiveness. It is necessary but not enough to re-orient ourselves to reflect the broader and more complex nature of Canadian domestic interests, whether these be interdepartmental, provincial, municipal, or relating to civil society.

Equally necessary is the knowledge of the history, social and political culture and interests of target countries as we try to lobby for our interests, or join forces in common cause. And, when it comes right down to it, it is virtually impossible to do this effectively without a local presence, developing the local contacts and understanding the local sensitivities that demonstrate that we do, indeed, give a damn about our host country, and demonstrating that they have an interest in listening to our views. This is difficult to accomplish by remote control either from regional posts or from Ottawa. Starving a professional foreign service of the ability to do this will indeed render us as a foreign service à la Norma Desmond, ignored and ineffective, shrouded in the dusty and irrelevant memories of the past.

Un autre sujet portant à controverse est abordé dans le présent numéro, dans l'article de feu **Sameh Kamel** et de **Lawrence Woods** sur le rôle de l'ambassadeur du Canada en Égypte, **Herbert Norman**, durant la Crise de Suez en 1956. Cet article a fait l'objet de discussions animées au sein du comité supérieur de rédaction de **bout**, et nous accueillerions volontiers tous genres de commentaires sur la question. Cependant, **bout** n'a pas l'intention de passer tout son temps le front plissé. Notre ancien et éminent collègue, **James George**, nous brosse sa perspective unique du paradis terrestre qui, même à l'époque, se trouvait loin d'Ottawa, dans une délicieuse dépêche reproduite dans « Extrait des archives ». Le reportage photographique de **David Edwards** sur le riche patrimoine archéologique de la Libye et celui du nouveau retraité (hélas!) **Roger Lucy** sur l'Empire romain sont à la fois divertissants et instructifs, tout comme le plus récent casse-tête de l'interminable **A Aalto** (à qui **bout** offre ses plus plates excuses pour avoir omis un élément crucial du casse-tête paru dans le dernier numéro). Il y a également lieu de remercier **Bill Bhaneja** de sa fascinante critique du livre de **Glenn Page**, *Nonkilling Global Political Science*.

Nous espérons que vous trouverez amplement matière à réflexion dans le présent numéro — nous accueillons toujours avec plaisir vos réactions. Faites-les-nous parvenir à boutdepapier@pafso-apase.com.



Editor, *bout de papier*

c/o PAFSO, Ottawa

In Vol. 20, No. 4 of *bout*, you published a letter of April 24, 2004 to Prime Minister Martin from members of the Middle East Discussion Group and a number of retired Canadian Ambassadors, forwarded to you by Peyton V. Lyon along with introductory comments. Reproduced below is the Prime Minister's reply dated July 16, addressed to Professor John Sigler, one of the original signatories of the Group's letter. The reply is a courteous, bland document, which implies continuity in policy and emphasizes the "supportive" character of the Group's communication, but carefully avoids any comment on its warning list of "serious problems ahead," which was perhaps the most important and substantive part of the message. The long delay in answering was presumably due mainly to the election campaign.

Michael Shenstone
Ottawa

July 16, 2004

Dear Professor Sigler,

I am writing to thank you and your colleagues in the Middle East Discussion Group for your letter of April 24, 2004, concerning Canada's policy on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. I am gratified by your supportive observations, and I hope you will share my reply with the other signatories.

Many members of your group have been closely involved in the development of Canadian policy toward the Middle East in general and this conflict in particular. Their contribution has helped in crafting a policy which has stood the test of time and served as a reliable guide to successive governments through the shoals of conflicts which have affected many millions of people in the Middle East and engendered vigorous, sometimes emotional, debate here at home. The Government of Canada is confident in the justice of our policy for all the parties concerned and we believe that Canada has demonstrated its value as a fair-minded interlocutor to all the actors in this conflict. We shall continue to be guided by these long standing Canadian principles.

The degradation of the conflict since September 28, 2000, has undermined much that had been accomplished following the signature of the Israel-PLO statement of principles on September 13, 1993. Opportunism and miscalculation have fed recourse to violence and extremism, with tragic results for many thousands of innocent victims. Nevertheless the essential elements of a lasting and equitable settlement are clear and have received endorsement throughout the region and the wider international community. Canada will continue to make every effort to improve the chances for such a settlement, especially where we can bring our own "value added" — such as our work on the Palestinian refugee question, in promoting dialogue at the community level, or supporting human security projects.

I thank you again not only for your supportive letter but also for the valuable contribution that members of the Middle East Discussion Group bring to the quality of debate on this question.

Yours sincerely,

(signed)
Paul Martin

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From Nihon to Nasser: Herbert Norman's Diplomacy During the Suez Crisis

by Sameh Kamel and Lawrence Woods

FROM TOKYO TO CAIRO Much has been written about Herbert Norman in the context of his contributions to our understanding of Japanese history and the extended anti-Communist witch hunt in the United States that eventually caused him to take his own life. However, beyond a colleague's reminiscences (those of Arthur Kilgour in Roger Bowen's 1984 edited volume, *E.H. Norman*) and his biographer's assessment two years later (*Innocence is Not Enough*, by Bowen), surprisingly little has been written about Norman's service as Canadian Ambassador to Egypt in 1956–57, given that much of his work in Cairo helped win the Nobel Peace Prize for his Secretary of State for External Affairs (and a future Prime Minister), Lester B. Pearson. By reviewing the diplomatic circumstances during Norman's time as ambassador, exploring the connections between his reporting on Japan and Egypt, examining why so little work has been done on Norman's invaluable diplomatic contributions during the Suez Crisis, and reflecting on the ways in which Herbert Norman himself has been studied and not studied (especially in Canada), we can learn important lessons about how history is written and not written.

CONVERSATIONS WITH NASSER.

When Herbert Norman was reassigned to Egypt in the summer of 1956 from New Zealand — where some would say the Canadian government had earlier placed him in temporary diplomatic exile amidst the excesses of McCarthyism in the US and questions about Norman's loyalty — it seemed to his political masters within the Department of External Affairs (DEA) that Cairo would be another safe yet perhaps more intellectually challenging posting for a person regarded as one of its most brilliant political analysts. Events soon proved their initial motivation mistaken. Intellectually challenging for one of the world's foremost experts on *Japanese* political history it was; safe for Norman and the Canadian government it was not.

As portrayed in the 1998 NFB documentary on Norman's life and death entitled, "The Man Who Might Have Been," a

Canadian trade official had recently been murdered, the Suez Crisis was about to break, the appropriateness of Canadian involvement in a peacekeeping force proposed as a way of alleviating the crisis — an involvement that the Canadian government was desperate to undertake for domestic and international political reasons — was disputed by Egypt, and the excesses of McCarthyism — thought to be over — were not. Arriving in the Middle East in mid-1956, Norman found himself almost immediately thrust into the midst of an international and domestic crisis in Egypt over control of the Suez Canal. From late summer that year through to his death in the spring of 1957 he would be concerned — to his detriment with regard to his personal health, fatigue, and coping abilities as it turned out — with little else.

The more positive legacy of Norman's Suez Crisis diplomacy — as gleaned through a series of dispatches he wrote about his interactions with the formidable Egyptian president, Gamel Abdel Nasser — will be our focus here. Roger Bowen, Norman's biographer, refers at length to these memos found in DEA file #50153-40, Vol. 4, 1 May 1955–31 December 1956 and Vol. 5, 1 January 1957–15 April 1958 in recounting the events leading up to his subject's death in Cairo in April 1957. But the links between Egypt and Japan evident in Norman's reporting have been overlooked. Reading the first typescript labeled, "Cairo, September 3, 1956: Conversations with the President of Egypt," our immediate observation is that language, concepts and analytical perspective Norman had earlier used in his classic 1940 text on Japanese political history — *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic Problems of the Meiji Period* — were carried over to his analysis of his encounters with Nasser.

NIHON ON THE NILE. The product of a bygone era when at least one ambassador insisted on typing his own reports complete with errors and strikeouts, this September 1956 dispatch — in which Norman reports on his presentation of credentials and a thirty-five minute exchange with President Nasser — finds Norman having led off the conversation by confessing his lack

of expertise on Egyptian history. The academic historian in Norman nevertheless shines through as he recounts stressing the importance of history, expressing empathy with the situation of his host's nation and winning the confidence (or so Norman earnestly believes) of his host by talking of Egypt's "past and present problems." As the interpreter and conveyor of Nasser's words and ideas, Norman then reviews for Pearson and company his host's discussion of

1. the history of the occupation of Egypt by foreign powers and its desire for independence;
2. the need for any government seeking popular support to act as the guardian of the nation and national independence and in so doing to co-operate with other nations only when this could be done on an equal basis;
3. the ordinary Egyptian's avid interest in international affairs and understanding of interdependence (although Nasser's own understanding of interdependence caused Norman to suggest the Egyptian President "may be a rather naïve, even parochial-minded leader" at the head of what perhaps surprisingly "is essentially an insular country");
4. Egypt's resentment at broken promises of the United States, United Kingdom and the World Bank after World War II and the need for great powers to understand the aspirations of others — a continually rising "tide of independence and nationalism" being the alternative;
5. the importance of addressing issues such as poor living standards, population growth pressures, and the inequitable trading policies;
6. the relationship between the emerging Suez Canal crisis and Egyptian sovereignty; and
7. the relentless march of the Egyptian Revolution, with or without the President himself being on the scene.

Observing that Nasser had proclaimed that he had "nothing but friendly feelings for Canada," Norman also comments immediately thereafter that the President "made no reference whatsoever to Israel."

Norman closes by indicating that he has "endeavoured to capture as accurately as memory permits the burden of the president's remarks, making a few comments where they seemed pertinent." Even so, Norman's approach to the formatting of this report, what he chooses to include, and the words he uses in recounting the conversation bear a striking resemblance to his earlier writing on Japan. Two of the foremost analysts of his life and work, Bowen and John Dower, have drawn our attention to the humanity evident in Norman's accounts of Japanese history and the concern he shows for the common person. Here we find much the same concern as Nasser's claims about the ordinary Egyptian's understanding of international affairs provokes Norman to question the soundness of Nasser's own understanding of the world around him. Comments about Egypt's past and present problems echo the subtitle to his already highly respected book on Japan and his professional interest in narratives that use the past to explain the present. Similarly, the stress Norman places upon Nasser's references to foreign occupation (fresh in the mind of post-war student of Japan), the government as the guardian of the nation (an idea Norman had already demonstrated through his study of Japanese executive, bureaucratic and business elites need not be undertaken with the interests of the nation's general public in mind), living standards and population issues (subjects in *Emergence*), the pursuit of equality in international relations (a concept used by Japanese governments in the Meiji period to justify undemocratic practices), the Suez Canal issue's connection to Egypt's perception of its national independence (the struggle for which in the Japanese case had, in Norman's view, "inevitably led to expansion") again suggest the author was viewing the Egypt in which he had recently arrived through the same lenses he had used when offering his assessment of Japan a decade and a half earlier. Norman's emphasis on Nasser's personality is also reminiscent of his emphasis in *Emergence* on "the social character of the leaders who accomplished" Japan's rapid transition from a feudal to industrial society.

In a 6 December 1956 dispatch entitled, "Call on President Nasser," Norman, who had not seen Nasser since their September encounter, reports on how an exchange on the niceties of Egypt-Canada relations turned quickly into a blunt discussion

of Canadian participation in the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), something Norman had wanted to avoid. Concerns about a new form of foreign occupation arose, this time in the context of Nasser's expressed fear of attempts on his life. Norman for his part felt obliged to set Canada's position in the proper historical context so as to allay fears about her links to the British Commonwealth and to promote her place as a staunch supporter of the UN. This encounter also saw Nasser break his silence on Israel by criticizing the aggressive Israeli policy towards Gaza ushered in by Ben Gurion's emergence as Defence Minister in the mid-1950s. The President indicated that such a policy would make it impossible to be friends or good neighbours, at the same time refuting claims that he had responded by calling for the annihilation of the Jewish state. Much more dangerous for the Israelis, in Nasser's view, would be the reaction of the "simple folk" to the Ben Gurion policy and the perception of a new form of foreign occupation under the guise of the UN, although he admitted to having "misjudged the public temper" about the UN mission. Here again one finds Norman using history to maintain his host's support for Canadian participation in UNEF — mindful no doubt that Nasser was once a history professor. He also expresses skepticism about Nasser's attempt to stress the importance of Arab unity and the role of public opinion in Egyptian political decision-making.

With the arrival of a new and fateful year, Norman found himself writing on 14 January 1957 about "Egypt at the Crossroads." It now appeared that the US was supporting the British and French in the dispute over Suez and that the present Egyptian régime was thus "facing a critical moment in its history," one which would require a difficult decision to be taken by a government that appeared to be increasingly indecisive, tense, stagnant, isolated, economically challenged, militarily inept, and primarily concerned about its prestige at home and among neighbouring Arab countries. The US, neither willing to assist Nasser with his political, diplomatic and economic troubles nor keen on encouraging a coup, seemed, from Norman's vantage point, "to be content to let this régime wither on the vine." Had Norman's abiding supposition in his analysis of Japan that you reap what you sow been proven correct once again, this time in the Egyptian context?

The final installment in this series comes on 15 March 1957, in what would be Norman's report of his last "Conversation with Nasser" the previous evening. Here

his *forte* as an historian skilled in promoting cross-cultural understanding is put to a dramatic test as he is tasked by the Canadian government with preventing the diplomatic and domestic political disaster that would come with Egyptian refusal to Canadian participation in UNEF on the grounds that as a member of the British Commonwealth Canada was either harbouring or fronting for imperialist designs. As appropriately highlighted at the beginning and end of the 1998 NFB documentary on Norman, the record shows that he succeeded in his mission that day, using all the historical ammunition he could muster in his country's cause. A verbal *tour de force* won over Nasser, who had hitherto clung to the idea that the Canadians, rather than coming in peace, might somehow be easily persuaded to use military force against him. This attitude had been created in part by bureaucratic filters that skewed communications between the two countries, a danger Norman was well aware of from his studies of the Japanese state. The secret of his success that day was that the real work had been done in his two earlier exchanges with the Egyptian leader. The rapport that had developed between the two men now provided the entrée Norman so desperately needed in this time of crisis. As Norman recounts, Nasser "was glad that some false impressions had been removed and hoped that friendly relations would exist between us as between two free and equal states with no designs on each other." So successful had Norman been that Nasser also "expressed the wish that I might perhaps see him more often if I so wished, particularly if it would help in clearing up possible misunderstanding." Admired by many Japanese for drawing their attention to their forgotten democratic tendencies and traditions, Norman ended his report by noting that he had congratulated Nasser on his recent announcement that general elections were to be held. Canadians, as "a democratic people," Norman said, would be pleased by this development in Egypt "since it would certainly help in closer understanding between us both." Having already become a beacon of Japanese democracy, Herbert Norman could now be doubly proud.

FROM HERO TO HIDDEN. Ironically and tragically, on the very day of his greatest diplomatic triumph, Norman was once again accused by a US Senate investigation of being a communist. These renewed accusations are generally understood to be the cause of his death by suicide in Cairo on 4 April 1957. This story has been widely told and will not be reviewed here.

Of greater import in our view looking back from our Middle Eastern vantage point now almost fifty years later is the question of why Norman's diplomatic efforts in Egypt have been neglected by scholars, particularly Canadians and moreover Canadian scholars? After all, these efforts would be largely responsible for securing the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize for his friend and boss Lester B. Pearson, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs during this period who is generally credited with proposing the idea of UN peace-keeping at the time of the Suez Crisis and who would soon shortly become the Prime Minister of Canada on the strength of his Nobel success. The most extensive studies of Norman's scholarship and life, for instance, have been penned by Americans, Dower and Bowen. Why? Several possible answers come to mind:

1. The real work in life and in diplomacy is often done behind the scenes. Behind every individual Nobel Peace Prize winner there is usually a host of people without whom the recipient would not have been a candidate. This is perhaps why so many groups, institutions and organizations have received the award in recent decades.
2. Canadians are not very good at recognizing their heroes. Like so many people from heretofore predominantly Judeo-Christian cultures, they are even less prone to celebrate a hero who later committed suicide, no matter what that person had done before. Indeed, merely suffering from any form of mental illness can lead to marginalization or the willful forgetting by others of a person's accomplishments.
3. That Norman's death came so soon after his greatest accomplishment as a diplomat no doubt compounds the problem in his case. With little time to celebrate and being in such a secretive profession, the news would have been widely spread and would likely have been overshadowed to the point of almost being denuded of any sense of significance. Our memory of his accomplishments would also have been overshadowed by the further rise of Lester Pearson, whose own memoirs do not help much in remedying our understanding of Norman's role in the activities that brought Pearson the Nobel Peace Prize (perhaps because of the subsequent sensitivity of the issue in the wake of the circumstances surrounding Norman's death). Some fortieth anniversary celebrations of this award compounded this

problem by failing to refer to Norman's contributions on Pearson's behalf.

4. Active academic efforts to erase the memory of Norman as a leading scholar of Japanese history in the twentieth century, efforts connected to the allegations in the US Senate of his communist political sympathies and Marxian analytical tendencies, have not done much to keep the memory of his accomplishments alive within classrooms or the academy in Canada and abroad, save for in Japan where his publisher, Iwanami Shoten, marked the new millennium by re-releasing his complete works in Japanese.
5. In the arts community, sometimes the last repository of historical memory, the record is also mixed. Al Purdy drew our attention positively if cryptically to Norman's plight in the poem, "Homo Canadensis," but Timothy Findley — in a Purdy-like effort to have us remember Norman with the play, *The Stillborn Lover* — did Norman a disservice by creating a composite character out of Norman and a homosexual Canadian diplomat, thereby causing further confusion about who E.H. Norman really was and what he accomplished as an historian and diplomat. If anything, Findley's character has only helped to put or keep whatever public focus might remain on the questions, "Was Norman a spy? Was he gay?"

ONE HISTORIAN AND HISTORY. Did Egypt become Japan when viewed through Herbert Norman's glasses? If so, is this surprising? Is this a problem? What do the answers to these questions tell us about Norman the historian and Norman the diplomat?


Our review of dispatches written by Norman during his time as Canada's Ambassador to Egypt suggests that one could build a case for transference. Though a significant finding in the context of Norman's studies, this observation is probably not surprising. Whatever he was, Norman's writings in the 1940s on Japan suggest him to be a humanist and it is unlikely that he would have lost this trait even with the rough treatment he received as a result of the career-threatening allegations that he was a communist he had to endure in the early 1950s. That his analysis of Egypt reflected this humanism through his highlighting and questioning of Nasser's comments about ordinary Egyptians, simple folk, public support and living standards is evidence of a continuous

thread and concern in Norman's worldview and historical narrative. Nor should we consider this transference or continuity a problem; far from it, especially given the high level of respect given to his analyses of both Japan and Egypt. He may have known Japan better and been more qualified to render judgments about that country, but Norman's skills as a student of history made him the fast learner, astute observer and intelligent reporter many diplomats are called upon to be when it came time to represent his country in Egypt. He used the analytical tools he had developed and those tools served him well in his efforts to understand and convey his understanding of both cultures and his own to others.

Norman the historian and Norman the diplomat thus complemented each other well. His successes in Japan, Egypt and elsewhere — perhaps with the lone exception of the US Senate — may not have been successes had there not been this complementarity. But even in the case of the US Senate's ideological witch hunt it is possible to see Norman the victim as a success because of the way that his case, as one of the most tragic elements in the story of McCarthyism, illustrates the dangers, cost and absurdity of political excess.

Finally, we are moved to conclude that observing the ways in which Herbert Norman has and has not been studied, especially in Canada, we can derive important lessons and reminders about the ways in which history is written and taught. Conceding that the word might also be *herstory* and should at least be *histories*, we find in the ways in which the Norman story is and is not remembered a fine if unfortunate example of the domestic and international politics of forgetting. What passes for history is often just as much about what we are consciously directed by our parents, politicians, journalists, teachers and historians to remember about the past as it is about what we are consciously taught to forget. ☉

*Before his death in July 2002, Dr. Sameh Kamel was Assistant Professor of Public Administration at the American University of Sharjah (AUS). Dr. Larry Woods taught at the University of Northern British Columbia before his current post at the AUS where he is Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations. Among other publications, Dr. Woods edited Herbert Norman's 1940 book, *Japan's Emergence as a Modern State* for republication by the University of British Columbia Press in 2000. This article is based on a collaborative project by the authors.*



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
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
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Libya

A Journey Inside the Jamahiriya

Imagine a Mediterranean country with sandy beaches, well preserved classical ruins, cultural diversity, a good infrastructure, moderate prices and fine sunny weather. It is a safe and generally pleasant place for the relatively few visitors who make it there. Additionally, the country remains a somewhat exotic, "nouveau" destination in comparison to its neighbours.

Story and photos
by David Edwards

On the other hand, it happens to have gained a reputation of being somewhat controversial on the world stage. Welcome to the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. For a real rather than an armchair traveller, however, it would be more accurate to say a visitor receives a cautious welcome to the Jamahiriya. The term Jamahiriya translates roughly in Arabic to "state of the masses." It has officially been incorporated into the name of the country since March 1977.

Physical access to the country has eased with the re-establishment of direct air services to Tripoli, following many years of sanctions in the 1990s. Yet obtaining visas for independent travel there is still not straightforward or easy. With Libya's recent rehabilitation on the international stage, this may become less onerous in the future. However, one of the great advantages of a life in the foreign service is occasionally having friends posted in exotic locales who might be able to help out. Thanks to Ambassador David Viveash's generosity and efforts, I found myself "inside the Jamahiriya" with a chance to visit some of the country.

Libya has been able to combine its relatively low population (5.5 million) and high petroleum exports into a comparatively good standard of living for most of its citizens, while avoiding many of the obvious consumer excesses which one sees in a number of the Gulf states. Libya's oil wealth has been a magnet for nationals from other poorer countries, such as Sudan and Niger, who are a visible presence in Tripoli. Many work as wage labourers or servants and otherwise perform tasks that more prosperous Libyans are now unwilling to do.

Despite the influx of oil money on a large scale, prices in Libya are reasonable for someone arriving from Europe or North America. This is most convincingly, if not surprisingly, demonstrated at the gas pumps where unleaded gasoline sells for the equivalent of 11 Canadian cents per litre. Even at this price, the gasoline is still being sold inside the country at a healthy profit. Three decades of relatively high petroleum prices, particularly given the very low production costs, have also allowed the country to construct and develop an excellent infrastructure. Tripoli, the largest urban centre, with a population of more than one million, is a prosperous-looking city of white and green on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. Money has been lavished on some architectural monuments in the city, most notably the Jamahiriya Museum. It has one important archaeological building dating back to Roman antiquity, the Arch of Marcus Aurelius, not far from Green Square, the unofficial centre of the city.

In my experience, Libya was one of the most welcoming and interpersonally pleasant places I have visited in the Arab world. This somewhat reserved, but genuine, courtesy to foreigners is well known to others who have visited the country. However, friends back home were sometimes surprised to hear this, particularly given Libya's erstwhile reputation combined with the somewhat overheated threat rhetoric in the western media since the cataclysmic events of 9/11. There was a palpable sense from many of those I talked to inside the country that Libya has been unfairly and inaccurately portrayed in the Western media.

Sabratha Theatre




This calmness and courtesy was particularly noticeable as I wandered through the covered medina within Tripoli. While it is considerably smaller than its equivalent in cities in, say, Morocco, it was also a delight to wander through it in a relaxed environment without touts, bargaining or pressure from merchants to buy things. A good thing too, as the handicrafts on display were limited and there was little that struck me as interesting to purchase. My only real concern about personal security in Libya, one not to be taken lightly, related to the rather chaotic and aggressive patterns of driving. This was particularly true in Tripoli and along the coastal corridor heading towards the Tunisian border. Travelling in the interior of the country is less intimidating as there is comparatively little traffic once one gets beyond the urban centres and coastal routes.

The other notable drawback is the littering and garbage that one finds throughout Libya, including in the precious ruins of UNESCO World Heritage sites.

The country is well connected through telecommunications and the use of the Internet is widespread, as indicated by the ubiquitous signs of the Internet Explorer logo outside many small buildings and shops.

Access to the web is inexpensive at under \$1 per hour. There are, however, some variations on access which take into account local circumstances. A sign at one of the Internet points in Gharyan, a city 100 kilometres south of Tripoli, noted succinctly "Browsing of political and pornography strictly prohibited."

I was interested in three travel objectives beyond Tripoli. The first objective was to visit the famous Roman ruins of Leptis Magna and Sabratha. Those two settlements, along with Oea (now subsumed in present-day Tripoli), formed Tripolis (Latin for three cities), later to become Tripolitania province in the



Libyan boys at Ghadames

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Nafusa mountain range between Tripoli
and the Tunisian border... to visit the
ancient oasis of Ghadames.



Kabaw

Roman Empire. The second objective was to explore the Berber architecture in some villages in the Jebel Nafusa mountain range between Tripoli and the Tunisian border. The third was to get some access to the desert and in particular to visit "the Pearl of the Sahara," the ancient oasis of Ghadames.

The Roman ruins of Leptis Magna are among the most impressive archaeological sites in the world. The ruins are located about 130 kilometres to the east of Tripoli. The smaller but still interesting site of Sabratha is 80 kilometres to the west. Both are scenically situated right on the coast of the Mediterranean Sea.

The scale of the Roman ruins at Leptis Magna is extraordinary. The city was founded during Phoenician times around 1000 BC. Later it fell under Carthaginian control until it was taken over as part of the Roman Empire in 23 BC. Late in the first century BC a quarry was opened at Ras-el-Hamman, south of Leptis Magna, that yielded an exceptionally hard limestone used to build most of the town's later structures.

Leptis Magna reached its zenith in the second century AD when native son Septimius Severus ascended to become Emperor of the Roman Empire. Septimius Severus honoured

his place of birth by funding an ambitious building program that included a magnificent new Forum and a richly decorated four-way arch marking the intersection of the city's two main streets. Major construction started in AD 193 and continued for almost two decades. During its era of glory, Leptis Magna may have had as many as 80,000 inhabitants. The town also had a steady base of income from the slave trade, gold and ivory, as well as agriculture, which would have been considerably richer in those days. Its decline began with a devastating earthquake in 365, and accelerated with the disintegration of the Roman

Empire in the fifth century. It fell under the influence of the Vandals and by AD 534 it was part of the Byzantine Empire. By the time the Arabs came to control the region in 642, the city was almost empty. Within another century it was abandoned completely.

The excavations which resulted in the restoration of Leptis Magna were done largely during the most recent period of Italian colonization from the aftermath of World War I until the 1940s. The Italian dictator Benito Mussolini was eager to prove that Libya was historically part of Rome. Thus he poured great energy and resources into excavating and preserving the Roman sites, whereas suspected earlier Phoenician sites were bypassed and remain scantily explored to this day.

The remains have attracted far less attention than they deserve. For the time being, one of the greatest archaeological sites in the world is almost devoid of tourists and visitors. Leptis Magna was declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1982 and some additional work is being done to restore the site even further.

When I arrived at Leptis there were a couple of tour buses carrying Italian visitors who were being shown the main highlights by tour guides. Additionally there were a handful of Libyans visiting from Tripoli. But for most of the seven



hours I spent at Leptis, especially beyond the central sites, I was wandering through the extensive ruins alone. The hard limestone, lack of a nearby urban centre and dry semi-desert conditions have allowed the ruins to remain in a far better state of preservation than most Roman ruins found elsewhere in the Mediterranean. Even the excavations to date have not revealed all of the wonders of Leptis. The Amphitheatre and the Forum are located a couple of kilometres beyond the main set of ruins, virtually in isolation. I walked along a road to the east, ultimately

reaching the point where the road is blocked by a fence. There were a couple of Libyans working nearby on a broken down vehicle. They pointed to a hole in the fence a few hundred metres away where I walked through, and then I continued on to the Forum and Amphitheatre. The scale of the abandoned Amphitheatre in the isolated fenced off zone was not much smaller than the Coliseum in Rome. One can see extensive evidence of ruins that have yet to be fully excavated. It will take decades to completely unveil the magic and mystery of this most splendid of archaeological sites.

Sabratha, while smaller in scale, has, if anything, an even more beguiling setting right at the edge of the Mediterranean Sea with small sandy beaches on either side of the main ruins. Like Leptis, Sabratha began as a settlement to service the coastal trade of the Carthaginians. It was developed as a permanent site in the fourth century BC to act as a terminal for the trans-Saharan trade, since it had a natural harbour on an otherwise long and unindented coastline. It was shaped by the Romans after the destruction of Carthage in 146 BC and remained so until the Vandals took over in AD 455. Sabratha was retaken by the Byzantine Empire in AD 533. Finally the town was taken by the Arab conquest of North Africa, but it continued to prosper under them until AD 748 when trade moved to Tripoli and the town began to lose its importance and finally was left abandoned.

Many of the buildings in Sabratha were made from sandstone, and thus have not proven as durable as the limestone structures at Leptis Magna. The Theatre, reconstructed in the 1960s, is its main showpiece. Also notable are the columns of the Temple of Isis, virtually at the Mediterranean shoreline. The ruins are significantly more modest, both in size and in their state of preservation in comparison to Leptis. Once again, there were only a handful of Libyans visiting the site. Having the opportunity to spend a few hours in solitude amidst these ruins also counts as one of the highlights of a visit to Libya.

South and west of Tripoli is a low-rise mountain range, the Jebel Nafusa. The population density in this area remains relatively high. While dry, it receives just enough rainfall to have vegetation and some agriculture. There are numerous traditional villages throughout the various parts of the escarpment. It is the home to a series of ancient Berber settlements, including Qasr El Haj, Nalut, Kabaw and Tormeisa.



Arch of Septimius Severus

There are two main roads to Ghadames crossing the Jebel Nafusa. On the way there, I travelled along the coastal road towards Tunisia. Not too far from the Tunisian border is a side road which then heads in a southerly direction towards the mountains at Nalut. Qasr El Haj is located a few kilometres off this road. On the way back, I took another route which travels along the top of the escarpment from where Kabaw and Tormeisa are more easily visited, before reaching the urban centre of Gharyan, 100 kilometres to the south of Tripoli. From Gharyan, a significant city of over 100,000, one descends off the escarpment down to the coastal plain and back to Tripoli.

There are a handful of abandoned granaries in some of the communities. They bear a similarity to grain storage sites in nearby Tunisia, in particular Metameur and Medenine. Berber grain storage sites, though usually relatively modest in size, are among the more otherworldly of architectural sites. They have been described as resembling high-rise apartment blocks for desert gnomes. They are now unused storehouses where rural families previously kept their stocks of wheat and oil under communal security arrangements. The storerooms, some of which are more than 800 years old, were used until recent decades. Large pieces of old pottery for keeping oil and a variety of old farm work implements lie where they were abandoned. The grain sites are usually kept under lock and key by one of the villagers. Usually, you have to ask around town to find the holder of the keys. Once located, the villager sells you a ticket and unlocks the entrance. Beyond that you can wander around the abandoned granaries at will.


Qasr El Haj, Nalut and Kabaw each had their own distinctive granaries. Tormeisa is an abandoned Berber village perched at the edge of a high plateau from which the eastern beginnings of the Atlas mountains plunge steeply toward the coastal plain. The edge of the escarpment is probably at its most spectacular at this point. It has a very modest granary.

As one heads to the southern edge of Jebel Nafusa range, the already drying scenery starts looking ever more like the entrance to the Sahara proper. The population diminishes, sheep and goats are eventually replaced with occasional groups of camels and the scrub vegetation dwindles down until there is virtually nothing left but rocks and sand. We drove south through flatter topography beyond Sinoun, then on to the settlement of Derj. From Derj we continued west to Ghadames. The road is paved all the way to Ghadames, although in some of the later stages, shifting sand dunes have drifted onto the main road. The Algerian border is less than twenty kilometres to the west of Ghadames. The southernmost point of Tunisia is also close by and would be approximately thirty kilometres further north. By the latter part of May when I was visiting, temperatures in the desert were climbing into the high 30s and a light pinkish haze enveloped the desert sky throughout the day.


I had long been fascinated by Ghadames. My interest was initially piqued by an elderly British traveller in the early 1980s when I was visiting nearby Tunisia. He described Ghadames as the pearl of the Sahara, the ultimate dreamlike desert oasis. It was one of the Sahara's most prosperous and important locations, an entrepôt between Europe and great trading towns of the Sahel, such as Timbuktu and Kano. Ghadames was famous additionally for the trading acumen of the inhabitants and the creativity of its residents in constructing an oasis with unique and fascinating architecture replete with cool labyrinthine alleyways that kept temperatures within the old city much cooler than the surrounding desert. Many of the social customs have changed little over the centuries.

The 1911 Encyclopaedia Britannica described how as many as 30,000 camels would pass through in caravans on an annual basis, in its heyday in the early to middle nineteenth century. Later, with the drying up of the slave trade and with the development of more efficient trade routes from major centres such as Kano to ports along the Gulf of Guinea, the overland trade through the Sahara became less important and Ghadames faded over time.

I personally found the visit to Ghadames, however, to be an oddly bizarre and disjunctive experience. In almost all other places I have visited in which modernization has changed historic towns in recent years, whether Fez, Lhasa, Bokhara, Hanoi or Jaisalmer, people continue to live in the old town, while the population expands in a modern town beyond the traditional town centre. Even Khiva, in Uzbekistan, perhaps the most transformed and sanitized of ancient cities, has a modest core of families still living within the old walls. But not Ghadames.



Leptis Port



The final demise of old Ghadames was based not on the ill fortune of a decline in trade. It was the result of a direct decision to increase the quality of life of its citizens with some of the resources of the state deployed from the flush of oil money revenues. Putting aside my own romantic dream of wandering through colourful and exotic locales, one can understand the rationale of a self-styled socially progressive society with lots of money deciding to invest it in giving desert dwellers modern homes with air-conditioning, satellite dishes, wide streets and a magnificent new mosque.

Old Ghadames is today a ghost town, whose resident population dropped from approximately 7000 in the late 1970s to zero today. It was progressively abandoned in the early 1980s with the transfer of the entire population. I was told that one family stubbornly continued to reside in the old city for many years after all other had left, despite having an apartment block available in the new town. They were finally persuaded to leave a couple of years ago.

In the afternoon and evening one can occasionally see citizens bicycling through parts of the old town, chatting in small groups of two or three in the cool alcoves or tending to some crops in parts of the old town. Citizens still officially have title to their old homes and plots of land. Old Ghadames was declared a UNESCO world heritage site in 1986. Little work was done during the period of sanctions, but over the past five years the United Nations Development Program has been involved in some conservation and preservation work. There is a museum and a modestly growing tourism traffic which will probably result in the preservation of the most important parts of old Ghadames. Nevertheless, the gradual disintegration of the outskirts and the effects of decay and neglect of the

less central parts of the town is clearly visible as well. The abandonment of parts of the town to the elements while preserving some of the core parts of the town is a process that will almost certainly continue, and a visit to old Ghadames now is a very different experience than it would have been had I been able to visit in the early 1980s.


I spent a couple of evenings in modern Ghadames. I would

have dinner at roadside stalls serving barbecued mutton brochettes and alcohol-free beer. Locals enjoy watching sports programs on television or walking into stores selling the now universal bric-a-brac exported from southern China. Motorcycles, trucks and cars would occasionally drive by, stirring up

the dusty streets with a combination of particulate matter and diesel. The latest Arabic music blared from competing open-air restaurants, significantly ratcheting up the ambient background noise in the warm desert night.

But when I headed back to the old town again in the late evening, the modern sounds faded away. Looking skyward I could see the emergence of the panoply of stars. I could also see the silhouette of palm trees and minarets rising above the tightly bound labyrinth of the town walls and got a sense of primeval timelessness — of an era where camel caravans arrived in Ghadames, the pearl of the desert, having made the long and perilous trek across the silent wastes of the Sahara. ☸

David Edwards has been a Foreign Service Officer with the Department of Foreign Affairs since 1981. He has served in New Delhi, Lusaka, Harare and Yaounde. He is currently seconded to the Privy Council Office with the International Assessment Staff. He is studying various maps and atlases for the next destination.



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Canada and the World

Four Points of View



ANDREW COHEN'S BOOK, *While Canada Slept, How We Lost Our Place in the World*, published in 2003 to considerable critical acclaim, argues that Canada's standing in the world is in steep decline and that we must take steps to recover the position we once had, if we are to retain our national self-respect and the respect of others. Dissenters from this view include two Canadian ambassadors, one retired, one active. **John Noble**, formerly ambassador to Greece and Switzerland, and at present Director of Research and Communication at the Centre for Trade Policy and Law at Carleton University, reviewed the book in critical terms in the October 2003 issue of *Policy Options*. **Christopher Alexander**, currently Ambassador to Afghanistan, stated his objections in his speech accepting an award for professional excellence at the annual Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers (PAFSO) Awards dinner on June 12, 2003. Then **V. Peter Harder**, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed the issues during his speech to the Retired Heads of Mission Association in Ottawa on March 17, 2004.

Andrew Cohen issued a vigorous reply to Noble and Alexander, as well as taking some side-shots at **Lloyd Axworthy** and Peter Harder, in his speech to a PAFSO Professional Committee breakfast seminar on April 15, 2004. To present these four pieces together, we have had to edit for length for reasons of space.




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
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Overestimating Canada's Decline in the World,

October 2003

John J. Noble



ANDREW COHEN'S BOOK

CLAIMS that Canada has abandoned its spirited internationalism with a less broad vision, a much-weakened military and a less generous attitude as an aid donor, and is less effective in its diplomacy. He notes that some of the realities of spending on defence, aid and diplomacy don't square with the mythical images of Canada as a peacekeeper, major aid donor, trader and diplomat. He asks "Can we expect to sit at the global table by virtue of our economic power without pursuing a foreign policy worthy of our history, geography and diversity?"

Many of Cohen's criticisms are correct, including the many which he echoes from discontented members, past or present, of the military and foreign service. But his basic criticism that Canada has lost its place in the world doesn't stand up to serious scrutiny, nor does the allegation that everything that has taken place has been done in a deep slumber.

Cohen also makes a major mistake in assuming that the problems he identifies can be corrected simply by the addition of new financial resources in all three sectors. Faced with a choice between a declining health care system and more expenditure on aid, military and the foreign service, what would most Canadians choose? He fails to show how a beefed-up military will have much of a role to play in the fight against the new threat of international terrorism, where Canada's best contribution might be to help keep terrorists from reaching our shores or from entering the United States via Canada, a task which is totally outside the purview of the Canadian military.

Cohen looks back to the Golden Age of Canadian diplomacy through the prism of three of its strongest figures: Lester Pearson (known mainly because of his time as foreign minister, when he won the Nobel Prize, and then as prime minister, when his main achievements were domestic), Hume Wrong and Norman Robertson (virtually unknown outside the public service), whom he idolizes for the idealism they embraced,

the diplomacy they practiced and the standards they set. Cohen gives no credit to Pearson's political bosses throughout this period, primarily Louis St-Laurent, who was first his minister and then his prime minister, as having been involved in any way in any of the successes.

The G7/G8 summit process, which started out in 1975 as an effort to deal with international economic co-operation in the light of the oil crisis, has become a year-round exercise involving the prime minister, his ministers of finance and foreign affairs and sometimes other ministers, and their officials to look at major political and economic issues. These are much more than photo opportunities in idyllic settings and involve Canadian diplomats on a daily basis.

Cohen acknowledges the important role which trade played in the careers of Wrong and Robertson, but then suggests that the fusion of the Department of External Affairs and the "trade" parts of the former Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce (and not just the Trade Commissioner Service as claimed by Cohen), was a mistake and has resulted in an overemphasis in Canada's foreign policy on trade versus more traditional diplomatic pursuits. I think Cohen is dead wrong here and he has sided with some "traditional purists," who do not see trade and economic interests as part of Canada's diplomacy, when in fact they always have been, even during the so-called Golden Age.

The idea that our aid program is not part of foreign policy is equally wrong-headed as are Cohen's pleas to untie Canadian aid to the detriment of Canadian business and farmers, but to also introduce a new type of conditionality by linking aid to human rights performance. The idea that Canada should concentrate its aid program in the 15 least developed countries that practice good governance is an oxymoron on several counts. Cohen rightly emphasizes the disgraceful decline in the level of our aid program as a percentage of GNP, which has taken us almost to the bottom of the

OECD countries as a percentage of GNP, though not in actual dollar terms.

Cohen does admit that Canada and the world have both changed since the Golden Age, when Canada played an abnormally pre-eminent role. He also admits that the WASPish male-only Canada that Pearson, Wrong and Robertson epitomized has long since disappeared into a multicultural/multilingual society where communities in Canada with roots in almost every country on the planet are able to exercise political influence on Canadian foreign policy, some with more effect than others.

Cohen's book focuses almost exclusively on relations with Washington (always the top priority) and London (a faded owner and one which has trouble deciding between its Atlantic and European vocations), to the detriment of all other relationships. Times have changed and many new actors have emerged.

Cohen briefly alludes to the national unity crisis which Canada faced from 1967 on, but doesn't fully develop the extent to which this has impacted on Canadian aid, foreign policy and diplomatic practice in the 35-year period since then. National unity issues took up tremendous foreign policy and aid resources and by and large can be called a success. Francophone summits in which the premiers of Quebec and New Brunswick can participate alongside the prime minister of Canada are a reality today.

Cohen unfairly accuses Jean Chrétien of being the most parochial PM since the first part of Mackenzie King's term of office. Despite having presided over the decline in our military spending after the hiccup of increased spending by Mulroney, as well as the decline in our aid budget, started under Mulroney, Chrétien has continued to play an active role on the world stage in the various international organizations of which Canada is a member. Canada easily won its bid for another term on the UN Security Council; Chrétien kept troops in Bosnia and participated in the Kosovo War without a UN Security Council mandate, and he pushed forward two of the most innovative diplomatic initiatives taken anywhere (the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Land Mines and the International Criminal Court). Chrétien's success at deficit reduction was the envy of the G8 and it gave him enhanced credibility to speak on economic issues at those summits and elsewhere. He supported the FTAA and APEC initiatives and proposed an FTA between NAFTA and the EU. His environmental policies were weaker than

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Mulroney's and his eventual support for Kyoto was more a means of differentiating himself from President Bush than a real commitment to emissions reductions, where the Americans may yet beat us to the punch.

In the Chrétien years the British became so weary of Canadian activism that they called Canadian demarches "ABC initiatives" ("Another Bloody Canadian initiative") and the French were impressed at Canada's successes in the land mine and criminal court debates. Chrétien failed to get US participation in either of these agreements and failed to get US agreement to his initiative to stop the massacres in the Great Lakes region of Africa. It was US opposition and not, as claimed by Cohen, the lack of long-range military transport, which killed this initiative.

Cohen is right to point out some shortfalls in our military, aid and diplomatic practices. However, he is just plain wrong and overly romantic to say that the overall picture represents a serious decline in our diplomatic influence from the Golden Age, when even he admits everything was not as golden as some old fogies like to think.

All in all Cohen's book is worth a read and identifies some areas where more political direction, policies, and more financial resources are needed for Canada to be able to play a more effective role in the world. However, Cohen overestimates the extent of our relative decline in the world and rather than worrying too much about that, he should perhaps have concentrated more on policy options about what we could do to be more effective in promoting and protecting our vital interests. Where he does venture forth — suggesting a new Third Option and diversification from our economic dependence on the US — he turns his back on 40 years of history and dreams of a world and options which don't exist.

Extract from acceptance speech at the PAFSO Awards Dinner,

June 12, 2003

Christopher Alexander



ANDREW COHEN'S BOOK — *While Canada Slept* — argues that our diplomacy, development and defence have been one long, slow rout since Pearson, that only our success as traders has saved us from international irrelevance.

My question is, "Where has Andrew Cohen been?" He is lucid on two-dimensional facts and figures tracking Canadian engagement abroad. But his book leaves the agenda of the past two decades — which Canada addressed in leading roles — quite literally missing in action.

There is little or nothing here on the G7 and G8. The transformations of Central and Eastern Europe and of Russia and Ukraine are glided over in silence. The expanding diplomacy of the IMF on finance and of the World Bank and UN system on development are absent. The Balkans get short shrift. The theory and practice of the right to protect is glossed over and failed states and the new regional conflicts undersold. Strategic stability and the NPT are omitted, environmental diplomacy skipped. China's economic story is left out altogether. Terrorism is low-bridged.

These are not minor deficiencies. By leaving out the core of the global agenda over the past two decades, Cohen has excluded the bulk of Canada's international effort from his selective reckoning.


Yes, most of us in this room would advocate with Cohen an enlarged Canadian commitment to defence and development. But it is difficult to argue that our footprint on the international stage has diminished over the past 40 years.

In fact, it has grown immeasurably.

Wrong, Pearson and Robertson presided over a Department of External Affairs that began the Second World War with a handful of posts and ended it with not very many more. The wartime and post-war stars in this firmament — Massey in London, Ritchie in Bonn, Ignatieff in Belgrade and later New York, Ford in Moscow — shone because they were articulate, well-read and hand-picked. They could and did operate on the basis of personal rapport within tight circles.

But the instruments at their disposal were extremely limited. The impressive military force Canada fielded from 1940 until well into the 1960s was largely tributary to allied strategic command in whose councils our voice was, at best, subdued. Our diplomatic capacity — while highly conspicuous at the top — was thin in terms of both territory and issues covered, with much greater weight given to views from London and Washington as a consequence. We had little independent capacity to generate and assess intelligence. Our international information and media presence was negligible. Our foreign language capabilities were spotty. Unlike the US and UK, we had little to deploy in the way of technical and reconstruction capacity.

Let's be realistic: as Pearson cajoled his audience in San Francisco and Escott Reid harangued the allies in Washington — both unquestionably "present at the creation" — External in Ottawa remained in the care of a handful of officers and even fewer support staff who lacked a textured, real-time view of events on the ground in Europe and around the world.



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


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In their extent and complexity our international capabilities have today grown out of all proportion to what we enjoyed in the post-war Golden Era. One has only to count the posts, and to consider what each is doing.

So why has there been such an outcry and public debate of late — crystallized in Cohen's book — over a perceived diminishment in Canada's role and prestige?

The answer lies in the realm of the economy. If Canada is today a successful trading nation, this is mainly due to our unprecedented integration with the US. We are arguably now more dependent on trade with our southern neighbour than at any time since Samuel de Champlain founded Quebec in 1608.

This connection imposes certain considerations upon us.

But it also follows that most of the opportunities for Canada to enlarge its economic reach and international standing now lie elsewhere in the world — beyond this North American island we co-occupy with a great nation.

Andrew Cohen opens his book by comparing Canada's international relations to a Potemkin village. Apart from building model communities on the Dniepr, Catherine the Great's favourite ensconced Russian sea power on the Black Sea at Sevastopol and founded what was to become the fastest-growing city in Europe in the nineteenth century — Odessa. Each anchored Russia's assaults on the Ottoman Empire in the Transcaucasus and the Balkans, and sealed her emergence as a great power.

To the extent Canada's Potemkins are now expanding our global reach in the twenty-first century, Cohen may yet be proven prescient.

The project of building Canada's international presence is not yet complete. It is useful to have creation myths as compelling as those rooted in the McLaren cemetery in Wakefield. But today's challenges are to manage a large and multi-faceted organization; to compile and integrate vast amounts of information and commentary; to obtain views from outside the usual ambit of diplomatic work — from financial and commodity markets, from NGOs and civil society, and from conflict or pre-conflict zones, where the barriers of language, religion and ethnicity cannot be permitted to detain us from or blind us to emerging realities.



"While Cohen Slept" — Canadian Diplomacy in the 21st Century

V. Peter Harder

Setting the Scene

I HOPE TO SAY a few interesting things today about changes in Canada and the world that are forcing changes in the way we manage our international relations. But first, I would like to describe three factors that inform everything we do.

In a very real sense, the public policy consensus in Canada has changed from the one of only 10 years ago, and everything that we do, and I mean everything, is refracted through these three lenses.

First, fiscal responsibility. We spent some very rough years eliminating the deficit, and no government wants to ever again go into the red. That means that some very good ideas will not get funded. It means that new initiatives, particularly for Foreign Affairs with its low levels of discretionary funds, require the financial as well as the policy support of other departments in Ottawa. And it means we are going to be in a constant financial reallocation exercise, challenged to free up funds to meet new and more urgent priorities at the expense of existing or planned expenditures.

Second, economic space is greater than political space. Our economy is thoroughly globalized, but our political concerns are focused on relatively fewer areas than ever before. I don't mean to in any way diminish the stakes in Afghanistan or the Middle East or the former Soviet Union; but I think compared to the old East-West division of the world, the space

where vital political issues are at stake is undoubtedly smaller.

Third, it is all about the knowledge society. The free movement of goods, service, labour and capital, while not absolute, is still freer than anything we have seen before. Government increasingly sees itself as being in the "knowledge" business, not simply through education funding, but in so many other areas as well. To a remarkable extent, we are out of "bricks and mortar" and very much into ways to best support Canada's impressive achievements in the new knowledge-based sectors.

With this as prologue, let me start by mentioning two recent events that, I have to admit, took me quite by surprise.

The first was the publication last year of Andrew Cohen's stimulating examination of what he sees as the decline of Canadian influence in the world and the role that the decline in our foreign service has played in this slide. As many of you know, the book has been very well received, and has stimulated many citizens and commentators to think more deeply about where we are headed as a country, and whether there are things we can do to improve our prospects.

The second was a comment last month by Allan Gregg, the noted pollster and political commentator. Speaking on TV, Mr. Gregg said that the three big themes for the next federal election would be:



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increasing income differentials, or "do I belong to this club;" declining social services, or "is this club worth belonging to;" and the decline of Canadian influence in the world, or "what do others think about this club."

I find this interesting. I am certainly pleased that people are concerned about Canada's place in the world — so concerned that it may even be a major electoral theme. It's good to know that people care.

And yet, they are also concerned that we are in decline, that we count for less on the world stage. And this cannot be a source of comfort to any of us who care about this country.

Are they right?

A number of responses to Andrew Cohen's book, in particular, have been quite dismissive. Of course Canada had greater influence in the world 50 years ago. Europe was in tatters, and there were scarcely more than 50 countries in the United Nations. It was both a smaller pond and a very different one, and so any efforts to compare the two are simply un-historical.

I think this is far too easy. I know there is more than a hint of nostalgia in the

Cohen book, and this is like red meat to the hard-nosed realists among us. But there are also some very acute observations of what we have done to ourselves, quite separate from changes in the world. Of course, we can always argue that many of these decisions were necessary, even desirable, but there is no escaping the charge that many of the things that we did, that are seen to have weakened Canadian influence and the foreign service, were our decisions alone.

Decline: It's an Impressive Club

Today, I want to take the Cohen thesis and the Gregg perception seriously. and ask...

Are we in decline? If we are in decline, should we be worried? If we should be worried, what can we do about it?

Has Canada's place in the world declined? Of course it has. Of course, it hasn't.

On the one hand, on the other. Yes and No. Here we go again, you must all be thinking.

In truth, there is no simple answer to the question.

Seen historically, as I mentioned earlier, there can be no doubt we have declined. After WWII we had, I believe, the third largest merchant fleet in the world. We sold it off virtually for scrap metal value and made people like Aristotle Onassis fabulously rich in the process.

I once heard a story, which I have not been able to verify, that after WWII, the Canadian Defence Liaison Staff in our High Commission in London maintained its own airplane!

We had money, and we had weight.

But things changed, with the rebuilding of Europe, with decolonisation, with the rise of Asia, and with all the other developments that shifted relative political and economic weights over the last 50 years.

We have declined, at least measured in terms of our ability to influence international events. But here's the surprising thing: the influence of almost every other country that was important after the war has declined as well.

Think of Europe. Does anyone believe, if we were designing a United Nations Security Council from scratch today, that both Britain and France would have permanent seats? Perhaps one for the European Union, but two permanent seats for Western Europe? All the countries of the European Union see their further integration as a necessary step to main-

taining any substantial influence at all over international developments. On their own, almost every one is weaker than before, and so they bind themselves together, in part, as a way of retaining some purchase on power.

Think of Russia, compared to its influence at the heart of the Soviet Union and Empire.

Think, and this is most radical, of the United States. We are so used to talking of its enormous power, its hyperpower as the French call it, that we forget how much it too is buffeted by events beyond even its control. People talk of the enormous American economy, and how it dominates the globe. Well, yes and no. Compare today's influence on the global economy with the time when we had a system of exchange rates fixed to the US dollar backed by gold. Seems like an eternity ago. Think of the US today facing threats against its own sovereign territory, launched from countries like Afghanistan or Yemen or Somalia, and compare that to the US of 40 or 50 years ago. Having to fight, according to its own calculations, two wars in two years in an effort to counter threats and reassert influence. I know there was the Soviet menace, but that was manageable because of American leadership and influence in Europe and elsewhere. Today, despite all its power, the USA and the rest of us face real and lethal threats, and our capacity to influence the launching pads for these threats is much more limited than we would like.

In other words, from one perspective at least, most of us are in decline.

Decline or Liberalisation

But there is another way to look at the decline. Not as something "done to us" by changes in the world, but rather as something we did to ourselves, as a matter of explicit national policy. I am thinking here of the ways that all Western Governments, with Canada in the forefront among them, made decisions to reduce the role of government, both at home and abroad.

Internationally, I am thinking of decisions like international trade agreements, or air deregulation agreements, or financial services agreements and investment agreements. I am thinking of the wide range of instruments that have freed the private sector from constraints of various kinds, freed it to operate very differently from the way it did 40 or 50 years ago. I am thinking of telecommunications agreements that allowed corporations and individuals to maximise the benefits of the

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new technologies. I am also thinking of technical agreements like the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement that established bilateral, independent advisory boards.

All of these instruments have one element in common: they are all designed to insulate important international activities against interference by governments. Bit by bit, agreement by agreement, we have freed up so many international transactions from the direct control of government. The cumulative effect has been enormous.

We use language like "the Canada-USA relationship" as a kind of shorthand to describe the things we do across the border. But we shouldn't fool ourselves. The vast majority of that relationship, the overwhelming number of transactions across the border, take place with no reference to government at all. And we can say the same for our relationships with all the developed and many of the developing countries of the world.

Andrew Cohen calls his book: "While Canada Slept." In truth, Canadian governments, like governments around the world, have been far from asleep. They have been busy negotiating new rules of the road that make the world today vastly different than the world of 40 or 50 years ago, rules of the road that deliberately limited the capacity of governments to influence international affairs of all kinds.

Globalisation didn't just happen by itself; it was made possible by the combination of enormous technological advances and new rules to allow for much freer international trade and finance, including in many countries that 40 years ago either didn't exist or were locked, like the Soviet Union and its satellites, into closed economic systems.

We have seen a parallel development domestically as well. When we think back only a few years, we remember a national airline, a national railway, an unchallenged national broadcasting system.

Parties used to run for office promising job creation, and they could deliver to some extent because governments controlled such a large portion of the economy. How things have changed, though our political rhetoric may not have kept up all that well.

Canada: More than Just Government

The fact is, governments today exert influence over narrower spheres of international and domestic life than ever before in our history. Is this decline? Have we as a nation declined, measured in terms of our

prosperity, our freedom, our cultural and scientific achievement?

Canadians today are probably more influential around the world than ever — in business, in the arts, in development assistance, in NGO's and communications. We have seen an extraordinary blossoming of Canadian innovation and talent in the last two decades, and Canadians — even if occasionally mistaken for Americans — are recognised around the world. Seen from abroad, the great success story in Canada is the ways we have welcomed people from all over the world into a dynamic, thriving society. Governments play a role, but private Canadians have, in their schools, their businesses, their clubs and churches and neighbourhood groups carried the load. We often take this for granted, but experts from around the world are coming here to see how we are doing it. Think of the challenges we are and will continue to face in the world, and the message that very diverse people can live together in harmony is extraordinarily positive and hopeful.

When people say Canada has lost influence in the world, they are often thinking along very traditional lines of state-to-state relations, and have missed the dramatic changes in the world and in Canada that Canadians have capitalised on so effectively. By that measure, Canada — the people as well as the government — has a lot more influence and impact than our critics give us credit for.

The Stuff Left Behind

With that as background, what is left for governments to do? Leaving aside proper management of programs, and similar tasks, what is left is surprisingly interesting. It is interesting because it is often complex and difficult. One could almost say the private sector ran off with the easy stuff, and left governments holding a bagful of nasties.

Consider international security. The Cold War had its terrifying moments, but we also established some pretty clear "rules of engagement" that provided a centre of gravity, a stability to East-West competition. Since the fall of communism, Canadian soldiers have been deployed into live war zones in the Gulf, in Kosovo and Afghanistan. They have been involved in difficult and dangerous peace enforcement missions in the Balkans and Haiti. We have witnessed genocide in Rwanda and a slaughter in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that defies belief.

I won't recite the new terrorist threats we face, since you know them well, but I will say that efforts to address the terrorist threat are going to involve more complex and risky undertakings than just about anything we have seen in the last 50 years. I don't mean just military counter-measures: I mean efforts to address the legitimate needs of the societies that are producing so many of the terrorists.

We are only beginning to face up to the conflict between traditional notions of sovereignty and the increasing demand to become involved — somehow — in transforming entire societies. Rogue states, failing states, failed states.

The Canadian-sponsored "International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty" is a bold contribution in the realm of new ideas for these times. Its articulation of the responsibility of states in protecting their citizens and in the event of their unwillingness or inability to fulfill this obligation of state sovereignty, the report argues for a multilateral obligation to protect.

We are a long way from International Relations 101 of just a few decades ago.

Economically, we also have some tough challenges ahead. Admirable talk about the need to preserve the global commons is coming home — climate change, overfishing, public health, weaponisation of space to name just a few notables. On trade policy, the stalled Doha round suggest to some of the more pessimistic among us that the era of global trade agreements may be reaching its end, unless we can find innovative ways to narrow the gap between developed and developing countries in areas such as agriculture.

Despite our free trade agreements, disputes persist, and they can be real doozies; softwood lumber has been going on long enough to grow entire new forests! Even the relatively straightforward tasks many of you are familiar with are changing rapidly. Old style trade promotion is on the way out. We are not only looking at how best to attract foreign investment, and the science and technology that comes with it, but also how we can support Canadian investment, science and innovation abroad.

We used to talk of technology transfer as something developed countries did for the developing world; now, it is a cutthroat competition among developed countries.

The domain of the government's international operations has been narrowed in one sense but, at the same time, what is

left to do is often new, uncharted, complex and uncertain of public support.

Globalisation: Interdependence on Steroids

However we choose to conduct our international affairs, one thing is abundantly clear; the old ways of organising ourselves will not be up to the tasks. Which leads naturally to the question: are we ready? With a supplementary: if we are not, how do we get ready? And at least one more: can we do it?

Let me start by listing four major consequences of globalisation for how we manage our international affairs and, by extension, our foreign ministry. I'll be brief.

First, globalisation brings both greater vulnerability and greater unpredictability. International events can affect nations with unprecedented speed, and increasingly it seems we rarely know from where the next hit is coming.

Second, in international affairs, many of the issues that matter the most to a country are quite distant from the traditional concerns of a foreign ministry, raising the question in some minds whether we need professional diplomats at all or, at the very least, whether we can train a cadre of

professionals to discharge their new tasks effectively.

Third, we have seen a sharp increase in the number and power of non-state actors in the international arena, and their capacity to affect national politics and policies can be dramatic. I am thinking here of examples such as NGO's, multinationals, and global media outlets.

Fourth, traditional diplomatic structures are less relevant than before, and the downward trend will only accelerate. It is arguable that summits now drive issues more than any other single feature of international life. Leaders and their offices are in constant contact with each other. Specialised ministries are in constant contact with their counterparts around the world.

Does Foreign Affairs Get It?

When we look at these changes, we can rattle off a list of desirable qualities that we need today to promote and protect Canada's interests abroad. Qualities such as flexibility and adaptability, not just of individuals but also of institutions that have to rearrange themselves to meet new challenges. Greater openness to new international actors, including a readiness to see

them as an important element in both the development of policy and the delivery of programs. Greater creativity, and less reliance on traditional structures: think here of Royce Frith lining up British fishermen to support us in the fish wars with Europe. Greater integration with domestic policy makers, and greater familiarity with the people and issues that drive the domestic agenda.

This kind of talk has been around for years, but it grows more intense every day. Foreign Affairs has made some moves in the right direction, but it is a competitive bureaucratic environment out there, and I can tell you we are seen as not having done nearly enough.

Some of this criticism is unfair, but some of it is spot on. It is arguable that many domestic departments in Ottawa grasped the organisational and policy implications of globalisation far more quickly than our own Foreign Ministry, which has been talking about globalisation and delivering policy papers and speeches on it for years, but has actually done remarkably little to adjust itself to the new demands.

There is no point in rehashing old battles, just as there is little to be gained by lamenting years of budget cuts. In my meetings with my counterparts from other countries, I am struck by the similarity of our situations. We can look backward and feel sorry for ourselves, or we can move forward. It's actually a false choice, since there is only one option, and this government has made it abundantly clear that it wants a better integrated, more active Canadian presence abroad.

Does Anyone Else?

We have our marching orders, and so let me mention a few of the markers we have already set down.

It is clear we have to be better integrated with the domestic agenda since, as our speeches keep saying, so much of our domestic agenda is intimately bound up with developments beyond our borders. But there is an integration problem on the domestic side as well. Many domestic departments have set up their own elaborate international secretariats to look after the international side of their mandate. This is fine as far as it goes, but it has at least three shortcomings:

- first, it often makes it hard for our people to penetrate to the policy-making level in those departments and bring their international expertise to bear when policy is being formulated;

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- second, it often sows confusion abroad as different Canadian messengers carry different Canadian messages;
- and, third, it ignores another important feature of globalization, one that, if we continue to ignore it, will cost us considerably in the future.

I refer here to the way in which globalisation has broken down barriers that used to exist between domestic policy areas. It is old hat to say that fisheries management is international as well as domestic. Departments proud of their international expertise are singing yesterday's tune. One example: our approach on international fisheries issues affects our environment; it affects our social policies in coastal areas and, hence, our fiscal policies; it affects our provincial governments and their programs and policies; it affects our trade policies and the way in which we allocate our military and security budgets. Measures to address one problem could create havoc in another area. We can go on and on. Is Kyoto just an environmental issue? Is SARS just a public health issue? Is the fight against terrorism in Canada just a homeland security issue?

The Government Wants Results

The government has made it clear that the old way of doing business is not good enough, and I think that is exactly the message we need. It has instructed Foreign Affairs to lead a major review of Canada's international policy, and has explicitly told us to integrate our foreign policy development and international security policies into the broader review. It's a tall order, but we are off to a good start. We have said, from the beginning, that we are not looking to carve out international affairs for ourselves in some counter-productive and stupid turf war. Instead, we are trying to work with other Departments and Agencies to an unprecedented degree to pull together all the strands of the Government's international activities, and to develop coherent intellectual and organisational structures for promoting our international interests.

Ministers and Deputies are meeting regularly to discuss the review and, so far, the co-operation has been excellent. I cannot go into details, but I can tell you that we are being guided by one, overarching theme: to succeed in the world of the 21st Century, Canada will need a "whole of government, whole of Canada" approach to promoting and protecting its interests in the world.

Easy to say, but hard to do.

Whole of government means more, much more, than simply co-ordinating different perspectives on a problem. It means getting the best available people on any given issue to work together towards common purpose. It means sharing the lead on issues, and sharing the credit — and blame. It means breaking down rigid bureaucratic mandates that are often obsolete and developing flexible structures that encourage creativity and innovation.

Whole of Canada means working more creatively with the provinces and Parliamentarians. It means engaging private Canadians more successfully in promoting the interests of this country abroad. Trans-border industry associations can do a lot to keep markets open for Canadian goods and services, and can help us attract foreign investors to this country. Canadian companies can help set standards for responsible corporate behaviour in the developing world. Our artists abroad are showing the world that Canada is a dynamic, multicultural creative society, a country worth knowing better.

Can the Foreign Service Help Deliver Them?

Is there still room for a professional foreign service in this rosy picture? I believe so, and I will fight for it, but we have to change some of our habits.

We have to connect better to the "drivers" of the domestic agenda, not just the issues but also the people.

We have to open ourselves to much greater interchange with other departments. I would like to see us develop better ties with the provinces, with universities and with the private sector, including through personnel exchanges. I know there are some programs in place to do just this, but they are small and far from central in our thinking and planning.

Most of all, we have to decide on what core competencies we want to bring to the policy table.

It's the World, Stupid

I think it's pretty clear: our comparative advantage has to be our international expertise and experience. I say "experience" very deliberately. Living abroad, speaking their languages, getting to know people, what moves them, what excites them, frightens them, motivates them. Getting to know the local politics, the domestic "drivers" in other countries.

This is not the same as meeting your technical counterparts in Geneva and then flying back to your home in Ottawa. Think of the controversy surrounding the Multilateral Agreement on Investment a few years back. Experts had negotiated an agreement that they all thought was forward-looking and useful, and then were astonished when publics in Canada and many other countries were outraged at what saw — rightly or wrongly, it doesn't matter — as ceding all possible government controls over foreign investment. Many a technocrat was left fuming about "politics, bloody politics". Yeah, right. They didn't do their public policy homework.

We have to try to get inside the thinking of other countries, and we can only do that through first-hand experience. You can memorise a book of IMF statistics, but that is not going to tell you everything you need to know before advising a potential Canadian investor on where best to place his planned investment in South Asia. You can read a dozen books on Nigeria, or Thailand, or Britain, but they are not going to give you the "feel" for place and people that you need to make informed judgments. We have to be "out there", living abroad and bringing that unique experience to bear in the deliberations of the Government.

And the People Who Are At Home in the World

There is an added benefit: moving to different countries, settling in quickly, developing contacts, filtering information — these are much tougher to do than most people realise, and the ones who do it well are invariably adaptable people with open minds, natural curiosity, and a capacity to assimilate and integrate information very quickly. Sounds like a useful skill set for Governments dealing with public policy issues in the age of globalisation!

I believe a professional foreign service will be critical to Canada's future. I believe our experience and the skills we develop in the course of a rotational career are invaluable assets for the Government. I believe we should have more people abroad than we do now, and that our ratio of people abroad to people at Headquarters is badly out of alignment and in need of urgent attention.

But, as they like to say, talk is cheap. Can we "walk the walk?" This is exactly what we are trying to figure out. How do we staff our missions abroad to make sure we are getting the right people doing useful work for Canada? How do we

develop policy mechanisms in Ottawa to ensure that foreign service personnel work effectively with personnel in other departments and bring their international experience to bear as we develop policies for the 21st Century? How do we open up the foreign service to new people, new ideas, without losing the very qualities of mind and habit that make us unique?

These are the issues that most engage us at the moment. A stimulating, intelligent, credible foreign policy review is difficult enough to deliver. A review that actually changes behaviour in Ottawa, that actually produces better policy-making capabilities, that actually delivers better policies that serve the "whole of government" and the "whole of Canada" — that would be really something.

And finally, the review must pass the tests that I mentioned at the beginning — living with fiscal responsibility, properly calibrating our economic and political space, and, finally, helping to build the knowledge society — on these points at least there is no choice; we do it or we disappear.

I think it can be done, and I believe deeply that a professional foreign service is a critical element in getting there.



Remarks to PAFSO's Professional Committee Breakfast Seminar

April 15, 2004

Andrew Cohen

"Is Canada Awakening? While Canada Slept, A Year Later"

IT IS A PLEASURE TO BE AT the Department of Foreign Affairs today. I mean that. In the last year or so, since the publication of *While Canada Slept, How We Lost Our Place in the World*, the Department has offered me an opportunity more than once to discuss my book. At its generous invitation, I have spoken not only here, in the Lester B. Pearson Building, but in the United States and Europe. What it says to me is that the Department is open to hearing other voices — like that of the esteemed scholar, Michael Ignatieff, who gave the annual O.D. Skelton Lecture here last month — and is unafraid of a vigorous discussion, a good and necessary thing.

For this I salute Peter Harder, the deputy minister. In fact, he's so interested in generating a discussion that he gave a speech last month entitled "While Cohen Slept." Actually, I'm awake, and I'm flattered.

The Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers, which has organized today's breakfast, has long been a forum of debate. It was enormously helpful to me in researching my book; I am particularly grateful to Debra Hulley and Ron Cochrane, as well as Daryl Copeland, John Kneale and other officers of the Department who for years have thought boldly about our foreign relations.

Why I am here this morning? It isn't to explain the thesis of my book, which is that Canada isn't the nation it was in the world nor the nation it can be in the world; that we no longer punch above our weight and indeed we barely carry it; that we have a yawning gap between our resources and rhetoric; that we live, as Canadians, in a kind of Potemkin Village, riding on our reputation of two generations ago, labouring under a mythology of Canada as peacekeeper, warrior, diplomat and social worker to the world.

You cannot write a book like this one without attracting criticism, and I did. Fine. I welcome it; doing what I could to provoke a conversation we have not had was the point of the exercise. I was, I should add, well treated by critics, whose kind words on the front cover are now helping publicize the second edition. For some critics, it was I who was asleep, not Canada; I who had missed or belittled our achievements in the world; I who erroneously measured them in quantitative rather than qualitative terms; I — and this really hurt — who was a nostalgist, living in the sepia-coloured world of the 1940s, clad in Persian lamb coat and driving an open roadster, living in a lapsed world of Formosa, Indochina, Ceylon and the Levant, thinking of the art deco skyscraper and that new invention called cellophane, and mired, oh so mired, in that illusory Golden Age of Canadian

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Diplomacy, which, as Ambassador Tom Delworth once told me sotto voce: "You know, it never really was."

In other words, my dear Cohen, Wrong, Robertson and Pearson were perfectly nice chaps, but really now, aren't you making of the past than it was, and less of the present than it is?

The criticism, you should know, didn't come from politicians, from whom, actually, I received support. Members of the cabinet and the government caucus, as well as the opposition, had things to say. So did Brian Mulroney, even though he concentrated on what I said about Mr. Chrétien and not him. There was no criticism from the military, where I heard from current and retired officers, or the NGO community, or from my colleagues of journalism. Nor did much come from the Ivory Tower, though there was one famous historian. Come, come, he scolded, people like you ought to leave the study of history to people like me — which, no doubt, he'd get around to in about 25 years. I found that kind of condescension typical of the academic community, which has always resented journalists encroaching upon their territory. They never had much nice to say about populist historians such as Pierre Burton and Peter Newman.

Truth be told, the criticism of my book — such as it is — has come largely from this Department, or former members of this Department, and from its former minister.

Consider, for example, the view of John J. Noble, who served here for 35 years. Mr. Noble doesn't like the thesis of my book. He thinks that the argument that Canada has lost its place in the world doesn't stand up to "serious scrutiny" by which, of course, he means his own scrutiny.

Mr. Noble says that I assume the problems in our foreign affairs can be corrected "simply by the addition of financial resources in three sectors." I don't assume that. He says that faced with a choice between "a declining health care system" and spending more money on defense, diplomacy and development, what does he think Canadians will choose? But I don't say they should choose one or the other. I say that it will take a return to the principles that once guided us, a sense of what we want to be in the world. Then, yes, we will have to make choices, but they won't necessarily be between health care and foreign policy.

Mr. Noble says I give no credit to Louis St. Laurent for Mr. Pearson's

success in the world, when in fact I cite Mr. St. Laurent's seminal address at the University of Toronto in 1947 which gave intellectual ballast to the Golden Age. I also applaud St. Laurent for supporting Pearson, belatedly, in bringing Canada into the Colombo Plan in 1950.

Mr. Noble says that I don't think trade and economic interests are a part of Canada's diplomacy, when, in fact, I devote a chapter to trade and argue that our commerce too often trumps our conscience. Then again, human rights seem irrelevant to him.

In some cases, he doesn't seem to be reading the same book. He says, most objectionably, that I say that aid isn't part of our foreign policy, when I call for "a comprehensive review" of all the arms of our internationalism, one of which is aid. Interesting, as that is just what the Liberal government is now doing. I call as well for the creation of a Canada Corps, which, incidentally, the government is doing, by that very name. I'm not asking for a commission.

What is staggering is Mr. Noble's Pollyannaish view of the world and Canada's place in it. He takes a morsel of some of the things we have done and makes a meal of it. Among our achievements, says Mr. Noble, is that Quebec and New Brunswick sit at la francophonie and other international conferences beside the federal government, as if this were a great achievement. It isn't.

He argues that Jean Chrétien really wasn't that parochial, as I say, because, after all, Canada won a seat on the Security Council during his mandate. He seems to have forgotten that Canada has assumed that seat every ten years or so since 1949.

He says that we went to war in Kosovo, and that we should cheer that. Maybe, but he should know that our military contribution there was so feeble, largely because of our antiquated equipment, that the Americans told us to stay home next time. It's in the post-war analysis.

Mr. Noble also says that eliminating the deficit gave Mr. Chrétien "enhanced credibility" to speak at the G8. Maybe, but he should also know that, in strictly economic terms, Canada would barely qualify for membership today.

In fact, and this is where it gets funny, Mr. Noble says so active are we in international councils that when Canada came around, the British and French used to complain of "another ABC — another bloody Canadian initiative." Certainly,

we played a central role in the anti-land mine treaty and a lesser role in creating the International Criminal Court, which I applaud, but the importance of both is overstated as long as major nations, such as the United States, have opted out.

I have a suggestion for Mr. Noble; if he thinks we were so active in those international councils with so many ideas, let him talk to Stephen Lewis, who is now a special envoy to the Secretary General of the United Nations, and Kim Campbell, who chairs the Club of Madrid. Both have another view, and that's of a world lamenting a Canada that doesn't do nearly enough for its size and affluence.

The sadness of Mr. Noble's argument — which is why I have spent some time on it — is its aggressive complacency. It suggests that the elements of hard power — a real military, a real aid program, and a real diplomatic service — don't matter much. He calls these "shortfalls in our military, aid and diplomatic practices," as if they were accounting errors, counted in loose change, rather than in the currency of national sovereignty.

The numbers speak for themselves. We are the bottom of spending in NATO. Our international assistance is half of what it was a generation ago. The foreign service of Mr. Noble has real problems — which I need not tell you — none of which he acknowledges. The sense here is that the past doesn't much matter, that our vision doesn't much matter, and that we are engaged as we always were. It is kind of quaint, this happy denial, a glorious myopia.

Mr. Noble misses the point. It isn't that Canada is irrelevant in the world, which I never, never argue. In fact, I say that we do more than 190 countries of the UN, and that we should publicize that. My point is that it isn't enough. We don't act like the world's second largest country, its tenth or twelfth largest economy, which has fought in hard places, kept the peace, brokered and mediated. Our foreign policy doesn't reflect our history, geography, diversity and prosperity. Perhaps Mr. Noble had an interest in building all this and cannot abide anyone questioning it. He lives in a Potemkin Canada, a village of shadow and illusion, of which he could well be Mayor.

Still, he isn't alone in his criticism.

In June of 2003, on the night he was honoured by PAFSO for his exemplary service, Christopher Alexander offered a spirited, if extended, critique of my book. I like and respect Mr. Alexander, who is our Ambassador to Afghanistan, much as I

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think he's wrong. We had an exchange of messages, via electronic mail, which was amicable and lively.

Mr. Alexander asks "Where has Cohen been? He is lucid on two-dimensional facts and figures tracking Canadian engagement abroad." But, obviously pained, Mr. Alexander says I leave out the agenda of the last two decades. "Missing in action," he declares.

And what did I miss? Well, just about everything. Changes in the G7. The transformation of Central and Eastern Europe. The expanding diplomacy of the IMF. The World Bank. The UN. The Balkans. Terrorism. China's economy. Environmental diplomacy.

In other words, I left out "the core of the global agenda over the past two decades," and excluded "Canada's international effort from his selective reckoning." He says that it's difficult to argue that our footprint on the international stage has diminished over the past forty years. "In fact, it has grown immeasurably."

Difficult to argue? Grown immeasurably? Well, I wonder if we're looking at the same world. Still, I can learn from Mr. Alexander. Perhaps he can tell me about the seminal roles we played in the

G7, in the World Bank, at the UN, the Balkans, on China, on environmental diplomacy. I hope he will, and I hope he can, and when he does, I ask him to tell other Canadians, because they don't know about them. And I suggest they don't know them because yes, Canada did make a contribution in these areas, and yes, it fields more diplomats than it once did, but not everyone thought that contribution was as important as Mr. Alexander.

Heavens, to Mr. Alexander a list this long seems to compensate for a country that halved its aid (as a percentage of GNP), abandoned peacekeeping (under the UN), effectively disarmed itself, and let its foreign service come to the threshold of a strike. But really, things are fine.

He mentions, for example, the theory and practice of the right to protect. I mention that too, in my book. I salute our initiative. But let's not exaggerate it. We presented the report to the UN and it shelved it after September 11. When it was dusted off, six months or nine months ago, Tony Blair and George Bush barely noticed. Certainly it's a start. But if we really believed in it, why didn't we use it more creatively and strategically, before the war in Iraq, persuading our reluctant

allies at the UN that humanitarian intervention to unseat a genocidal regime was grounds for multilateral intervention? Did we make that argument?

Lloyd Axworthy, another critic, says the problem with my analysis is that "it paints by numbers." I like Mr. Axworthy, and we have agreed to disagree here. But he would say that, wouldn't he? The truth is that the numbers were so awful during his stewardship. I hasten to say that I don't blame him; he says that he supported every single proposal for increased spending on the military. It was just that the arms of our foreign policy were being cut disproportionately and he had to live with it as minister. He did. His response was human security and soft power, which brought us the Land Mine Treaty, the International Criminal Court, and the Kyoto Accord. I praise them, with some reservations, and hoped that Mr. Axworthy would win the Noble Peace Prize for the Land Mine Treaty. At the same time, I am wary of building a foreign policy on that kind of approach, based on treaties countries can ignore or abandon.

I am glad that Mr. Alexander thinks that we've grown "immeasurably," and he should tell that to Paul Martin, who thinks that our growth is measurable, and perhaps it isn't growth at all, but decline. Remember, Mr. Alexander, this is a prime minister who says that "we have punched above our weight in the past and can do so again," who wants to return Canada to the world to reclaim a position of influence and pride. Does that sound like a man terribly proud of Canada's stature today?

Mr. Harder, like Mr. Alexander, wonders where I have been. But if I read this right, he seems to be answering Mr. Alexander's question. When Canada was out remaking the world, as Mr. Alexander suggests it was, Cohen was too busy chronicling Canada's decline. I missed all the action.

Mr. Harder makes some sound points, and I cannot do them justice here. He argues, as all these critics argue, that we are doing fine things in the world, but many of them are not being done by national governments, so one is mistaken to concentrate on traditional measures. Provinces, states, cities, companies, churches, non-governmental organizations, individual Canadians are all active in the world, Mr. Harder says, and it is a mistake to think along the line of state-to-state relations. I cannot disagree.

He talks about so many important things, and he moves the debate forward, and for that I applaud him. He asks, What kind of Foreign Service do we need? What kind of

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resources must we deploy? What kind of expertise can we bring into government? How do we renew our intellectual capacity?

One thing that unites the critics is that they reject a discussion of our internationalism based exclusively on the three "Ds". This is too limited, they say, too confining, too restrictive. Some give it passing reference — that is, yes, more resources would be nice but let's not get too fussed about it. Sorry, I do. And saying that we do many things is not a rationale for what we demonstrably don't do; that argument

sounds to me like a comfortable complacency we already have too much of in this country and a reluctance to face realities.

I think we need a real military in whatever we do, but particularly as "the good governance nation," as Michael Ignatieff calls us, which is involved in policing, peacekeeping and nation-building. I think we need a fully-funded aid program, more focused and more accountable, I think we need to field the finest foreign service, which means recruiting and retaining the best, paying them well, and reconfiguring the

foreign service, which need not be Lester Pearson's foreign service. And whatever Mr. Alexander may say about our achievements, I don't think you can be serious in the world without those three elements and dismissing or ignoring them because you don't have them is simply too convenient.

The good news this spring is that we seem to be thinking with ambition and creativity again in the world. Mr. Martin talks of making Canada in the world one of his top priorities, a language we haven't heard in a decade. He has initiated the review and we have intelligent people here in this building at work writing it. He talks of rebuilding the military and is moving modestly in that direction. He is ready to take a position of conscience, as he did in agreeing to meet the Dalai Lama.

So I think that we are moving on, and we should. We should talk of the future now, not the past. As I respect the work of John Noble and Lloyd Axworthy yesterday, I respect that done today by Chris Alexander and Peter Harder. I have no doubt they represent the best of public service, with an intelligence and vigour no less than that of Hume Wrong, Norman Robertson and Lester Pearson. They are joined by many others.

Whatever we do, we will have to make choices. It isn't enough to say that everyone else is in decline, that the world is different, that there is less money to do things and less opportunity, that globalisation imposes new realities, offering a shrug, a sigh and wave. Yes, all that's true. It isn't enough to suggest, somewhat defensively, that things are fine, that we really do a lot which Canadians don't understand or recognize, and our challenge is really about salesmanship, much as we need it.

But every generation faces new challenges. I don't think that we can continue as we are and hope to be relevant without an understanding of the roles we can play and the resources we need. You see, I still think we need to find ways to matter on the big questions — in the Middle East, in the campaign for human rights, in fighting terrorism, in eradicating poverty, in reforming international institutions, in moderating American power.

In his memoirs, Charles De Gaulle famously said, "I have a particular idea of France." It is time that we find that idea, debate that idea, embrace that idea — and then, understanding who we are in the world and where we are going, give ourselves the means to bring that idea of ourselves to life. ☺

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Nonkilling Global Political Science

Reviewed by Dr. Bill Bhaneja

NONKILLING GLOBAL POLITICAL SCIENCE, by Glenn D. Paige, Xlibris: Philadelphia, 2002, 267 pp.

A former Canadian diplomat, Dr. Bill Bhaneja is currently Senior Research Fellow, Program for Research in Innovation Management and Economy (PRIME), University of Ottawa.

We have just entered the fourth year of the new millennium and war and terrorism are becoming the norm to resolve international conflicts. All the experience of bloody wars of the previous century and the wisdom thereby gained seems to have been wasted.

Professor Glenn Paige, in his recent book *Nonkilling Global Political Science*, argues that if political scientists, scholars who dedicate their lives to the study of political power in its multi-faceted manifestations, do not challenge seriously the assumption of lethality, then why would one expect political leaders and citizens of the world to do so?

Is a nonkilling global society feasible? Paige, in this path-breaking book, asks this simple yet profound question, but goes a step further to challenge his discipline, asking if a nonkilling global political science is achievable. On both counts, through insightful analysis and substantive evidence, his answer is a resounding "yes."

Glenn Paige, professor emeritus of political science at the University of Hawaii, writes from experience, having served in the Korean war. The work represents the synthesis of decades of his research, which includes a number of books: *The Korean Decision* (1968), *The Scientific Study of Political Leadership* (1977), and *To Nonviolent Political Science: From Seasons of Violence* (1993).

The term "nonkilling" is not as comforting as "nonviolence" because it confronts us with the modern violent reality that we witness regularly on our television screens. The reality is that mighty nations still consider that they can start pre-emptive wars, last experienced during the Third Reich and the Soviet period, without qualms. Professor Paige's use of the term is very specific; neither advocating pacifist philosophy nor religious faith, it is

grounded in the evidence-based approach of behavioral sciences.

Paige shows that both violence-accepting politics and political science in the last century have failed to suppress violence by violent means. The study of government and international politics has been unable to lay the groundwork and methodology for policy advice that goes to the roots of the causality of global violence.

Paige's vision is for political science to dedicate itself to a diagnosis of the pathology of lethality, and to discover both prescriptions and treatments that can be shared with all who seek to remove killing from global life. He shows that at most only about five percent of human beings have ever killed another person. Perhaps fewer than two percent of all homo sapiens have been killers of fellow humans (p. 27). Interestingly, a pioneering World Health Organization (WHO) global study on Public Health and Violence affirms that lethality resulting from suicides (50%) and homicides (30%) worldwide is much higher than war (20%).¹ Paige suggests why not then train people and nations globally to strengthen their resistance to killing? He uses life-affirming medical science as a metaphor. Medicine, through its continual research and training programs on prevention, intervention, and post-traumatic transformation strategies has proven successful in producing both knowledge and practitioners for the moral interest of preservation of life. Paige considers that same rigor and commitment to non-lethality can be made equally applicable to social sciences.

The last three chapters of the book lay out a road map for the large-scale reconstruction of a nonkilling global society. In a chapter on "implications for political science," the author proposes changes that might accompany a shift towards non-lethality in the areas of political philosophy, political theory, leadership and polity, policy studies, comparative politics, and international politics.

For instance, why has the study of successful leadership in conflict resolution without military intervention remained neglected? There is a long list of Nobel Peace Prize recipients who dared to take the nonviolent route for complex regime change in their respective countries, and

succeeded. Their accomplishments, leadership styles, ideologies, skills, and strategies are waiting to be examined and analysed. The Graeco-Roman writer Plutarch (40 -120 BC), in his comparative studies of rulers, suggests some principles that can be used to evaluate peaceful leadership in modern social science terms — personality, role, organization, tasks, values, setting, and errors.²

Perhaps the more important questions political science ought to be exploring are the place of a sovereign nation-state, international law, and the multilateral institutions of civil society in a uni-polar world. Within the United States, political scientists may also ask whether that country wants to be seen as the champion of a democratic world order, or as an empire striving to impose its economic and security interests globally at any cost.

Discussing the institutional implications of a nonkilling approach, Paige asserts that needed at all levels of governance are public service departments of non-violence with cabinet responsibilities. Their tasks would be to monitor community conditions related to the logic of nonkilling political analysis, to support professional training for prevention and post-lethal transformative rehabilitation, and to advise on public policies that will facilitate community well-being. Such a department would aggregate violent statistics and recommendations for violence-eliminating actions from all public and private sources and would make periodic status reports together with nonkilling policy recommendations to governmental decision-makers.

The author suggests that non-violence specialists be included within diplomatic establishments, just as conventional military attaches or officers responsible for economic relations are. A position of "non-violence cultural attaché" is proposed for embassies to "seek to build bridges of discovery, mutual learning, and co-operation between all sources of non-violent well-being in home and host countries" (p. 135).

Paige calls into question the Weberian dogma that the acceptance of violence is imperative for the practice and science of politics. On this bias, he writes that unlike natural sciences that encourage

development of pure theory as a contribution to practical applications, political science has tended to be unreceptive to theoretical imagination, and this is especially true with regard to non-violence creativity. By dismissing it in professional training as "utopian," "idealistic" and "unrealistic," political science is condemned to support perpetual lethality.

Consequently, killing that has been expected to liberate, protect, and enrich has become instead a source of insecurity, impoverishment and threat to human and planetary survival. This "pathology of defense" is such that, as Paige points out, what it is intended to defend becomes itself the source of self-destruction. Bodyguards kill their own heads of state, armies violate and impoverish their own people, and nuclear weapons proliferate to threaten their inventors and possessors. Again, in this there is an immense need for studying the psychological consequences of killing both within and outside of a war situation. More knowledge of post-killing stress would lead to policy changes in society to reduce murders, support for war, genocide, and mass killing by certain population segments and individuals.³

He asks that the role of political science in transition to non-lethal security is to develop theory and practice to provide credible alternatives to threat or use of lethal force — including preventive non-lethal transformation of the will to kill among potential adversaries. He points to a growing body of literature and experience on the subject providing a basis from which to advance.

Paige concludes that the time has come for a paradigm shift in the discipline: "If tradition has taught that we must kill to be free, equal and secure — the present teaches that unless we stop killing not only freedom and equality are in jeopardy but our very survival — individual, social, and ecological — is imperiled. We have reached a point where the science and practice of politics must be aligned with the life-supporting forces of society and nature. It (nonkilling) is not only good morality and good practically, but it is also this era's imperative for good political science."

Paige is optimistic that this goal is neither utopian nor idealistic, but one that is reachable and essential. He courageously identifies and defines in his nonkilling approach an imminent need for a new sub-field of political science. The book is both provocative and creative, an original work and a wonderful tonic for these troubled times.

The text is also available on direct link for download at: www.globalnonviolence.org/docs/nonkilling/nonkilling.text.pdf ☺

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
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
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TAUX CONCURRENTIELS

Stranger in Paradise?

As the report reprinted below indicates, some tourists are more observant than others. When he sent this numbered letter to the Department of External Affairs, James George was Canada's high commissioner in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) and consequently a member of the council that supervised the administration of the Colombo Plan for economic development in South Asia. At that time, one of the rare manifestations of an international presence for the Kingdom of Bhutan (or Druk Yul, land of the thunder dragon) had been its application two years earlier to participate in the plan. Bhutan had long considered its physical isolation as its best defence, along with a close relationship with its southern neighbour, first imperial Britain and then India. But that sense of assurance had been seriously eroded after the second world war, as the People's Republic of China invaded Tibet and then clashed with India in a border conflict that threatened Bhutan.

For outsiders, the popular perception of Bhutan was identified with Shangri-La, a romantic image that was fostered by its inaccessibility, its spectacular terrain and its relatively peaceful history. As visitors were rare, there was little to contradict this picture of paradise and foreign influences were largely kept at bay. Thus, George's visit there at Christmas 1963 was highly unusual and the self-described "tourist" took advantage of this occasion to provide a remarkably

complete and insightful commentary on the kingdom. Although there were no political parties in Bhutan, there were significant internal differences complicated by familial relationships. The prime minister (or lon-chen) of Bhutan, Jigme Palden Dorji, who was assassinated later in 1964, should not be confused with his brother-in-law, the king (or Druk Gyalpo), Jigme Dorji Wangchuck. The female informant, identified as Miss Tashi Dorji in the report, was likely Ashi (or princess) Kesang Dorji, who was the prime minister's sister. The present and fourth king, His Majesty Jigme Singye Wangchuck, has been Druk Gyalpo since 1972.

Though he thus ventured into an unfamiliar part of the world, James George was well qualified to assess what he witnessed. After serving with the Royal Canadian Navy in the second world war, George joined the Department of External Affairs. Before his appointment as Canadian high commissioner in Colombo, he had been posted to Athens, New York and Paris. Subsequent assignments included high commissioner to India, ambassador to Iran and Kuwait, and ambassador to Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. This declassified document was provided to **bout de papier** by Mr. George, to whom we express our thanks.

Hector Mackenzie

Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Colombo, Ceylon, to Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada, No. 42, Secret, January 29, 1964.

Reference: Our letter No. 19 of January 16, 1964.

Subject: Bhutan — A Tourist's Report on the Survival and Development of Shangri-La.

In my letter under reference I explained how we came to spend Christmas in Bhutan as guests of the Government of Bhutan. Although I must disclaim in advance any authority or competence for reporting on this remote corner of the Indian sub-continent, I am doing so because my hosts were remarkably frank with me, and also because (so far as I know) I was the first Canadian official to visit this country. I am, however, taking the precaution of sending my report through our High Commissioner in Delhi [Chester A. Ronning], who will, I am sure, correct my mistakes or add his own comments.

2. Bhutan's policy and Bhutan's problems can be put in two words: survival and development. Since survival must obviously have priority for any country, I am going to discuss this question first. For many centuries

survival for Bhutan has meant survival from India or the British, or whoever were to the south of them. Today of course it means survival from China. But I think we have to bear in mind, as the Bhutanese certainly do, that for most of their history they have looked north, not south. In the 7th Century, Guru Padma Sambhava brought them Tibetan Buddhism, and their life is still moulded in the Mahayana tradition.

3. It was the Chinese takeover of Tibet [political takeover in 1951; invasion in 1959] that not only shocked Bhutan to the core but posed, for the first time in an acute form, the question of national survival. Until then it had been enough for the country to isolate itself, refusing to build roads and closing its frontiers to outsiders even more strictly than Tibet itself. To get into the country at all, the very few per-

mitted visitors, mostly Indians, had to travel for a week to ten days by mule, either from Assam in the south or from Sikkim in the west. The shortest route was from Sikkim through a corner of Tibet to Paro, but this mule route was of course denied to Bhutan as soon as the Chinese occupied Tibet. Therefore, even before Mr. [Jawaharlal] Nehru [Prime Minister of India] rode into Paro on a mule in 1959, it had become pretty obvious to the leaders of Bhutan that their inclination would have to be sacrificed in the interests of survival. They therefore agreed with Mr. Nehru that roads linking at least the main centres of Bhutan with India would have to be constructed as a matter of national urgency. In Lhasa the Chinese had for several years been talking ominously about "Tibet's five fingers" — Ladakh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sikkim and the N[orth]E[ast]F[rontier]A[gency]. Already, about 1955, the

Chinese had occupied the former Bhutanese enclave of Kailash after a combination of Chinese threats and intimidation so terrified the Tibetan wife of the Bhutanese representative in Kailash that they had both fled. A few months later the father of the Bhutanese representative in Kailash, who was the Bhutanese representative in Lhasa, was recalled, largely because the Indians were rather afraid that he might be the channel for a deal between the Chinese and the Bhutanese. Since that time, about 1956, there have been no direct talks between Bhutan and China, though unproductive negotiations have been carried on from time to time through the Indians. Not unnaturally the Chinese intimated to the Bhutanese that if they wished to discuss the Kailash enclave or any other question it would be more profitable to do so directly, rather than through Indian intermediaries, but because of Indian pressure based on mistrust, there have been no further official contacts between the Government of Bhutan and the Chinese.

Strategic Roads

4. Since India was worried about a power vacuum in this area, it did not take Delhi long to agree in 1960 to construct three strategic roads from India to the central valleys of Bhutan in the west, middle and east of the country. The understanding was, of course, that no corresponding roads would be constructed from the north, as has been done by the Chinese in Nepal. A fifty- or sixty-mile strip south of the Bhutan-Tibetan border has therefore been left without any kind of road — only mule tracks.

5. Today the road to Paro from Phuntsholing in Assam — that is, the western of the three roads — has been completed so that it is jeepable and can be used in comparative safety by one-ton trucks. In Eastern Bhutan the road to Tashigang has not got quite as far as the road to Paro, but is substantially complete, while the road into the centre of the country is about a year behind the other two. Twelve mobile wireless stations already link the northern and central valleys of Bhutan with India and a telephone line to Paro and Thimphu has been three-quarters completed.

Arms and the Men

6. However, on Bhutan's border with Tibet there is still very little besides the difficult Himalayan country — the natural barrier to geography

— to stop the Chinese. Bhutan's militia has been expanded from about 3,500 in 1959 to nearly 10,000 today, and about 15 Indian military advisers are training the militia at Wangdi Phodrang in the Sankosh [also known as Puna Tsang Chhu] Valley. Altogether, more than one-half of the annual budget of Bhutan is now spent on defence and there is conscription for military service. But until India can supply arms for the new militia, their training and preparation will not mean very much. Since the Chinese attack in October 1962, Bhutan has naturally been trying desperately to get arms from India (or from anyone else), but the Americans have taken the line that this is India's problem and India has simply not had enough to go around, so that Bhutan has actually received during the past eighteen months only 5,000 rifles from India, each with the princely allotment of five rounds of ammunition per rifle. So, although the tough Bhutanese soldiery are very skilful as archers and would no doubt be quite a problem for the Chinese in the Himalayan valleys as guerilla fighters, the position today is that the Bhutanese militia could very soon be by-passed or overrun and it would be up to the Indian Army to rush in troops in the event of any further attack along Bhutan's border.

Chinese Attack Expected Further West

7. Here it must be said that the Bhutanese do not expect that there will be a direct Chinese attack on them. They think it will come, but further to the west, either through eastern Nepal or through the main road south from Lhasa through Sikkim, that is, the road coming out at Gangtok [Sikkim] and Kalimpong [West Bengal]. Once the Chinese had managed to get through these fairly low passes, there would be no natural barriers to slow their descent onto the plains of West Bengal, going straight down to Calcutta. Indeed such a movement would rapidly cut off the great concentration of Indian forces in NEFA, Assam and North Bengal. We travelled by jeep through the Inner Line (that is, the security zone along the corridor of north Assam between Bhutan and East Pakistan [now Bangladesh]) and we saw for ourselves the enormous camps and great concentrations of motor transport which make both sides of that road look like one continuous camp for about 40 or 50 miles between Phuntsholing

and Siliguri. I don't know what the Bhutanese have said directly to the Indians, but they told me that they were very worried that the Indian Army might be preparing for an attack in the wrong place; that the defeat they had suffered last year in NEFA might cause them to concentrate too much of their strength in that area, whereas in the opinion of the Bhutanese the real threat was the direct route through Sikkim (the Tista Valley) or eastern Nepal (the Kosi Valley).

Chinese Invasion Plans?

8. The Bhutanese seem to think that the attack of October 1962 was mounted by the Chinese initially to correct several deep penetrations which had been made in previous years by the Indian Army north of the McMahon Line [the boundary between Tibet and Assam in British India after the Simla Conference of 1913-14, named for Sir Henry McMahon, Britain's principal negotiator] in the NEFA (as I shall be explaining presently), and was continued as a means of throwing Indian economic development off-balance and making India lose face — all the explanations that others have given too — but that it could never have been contemplated as a serious military invasion of India itself. Any further Chinese advance in November 1962 would have had to cope with several crossings of the Brahmaputra River in going further into Assam. The Bhutanese point out that there is no such natural obstacle facing the Chinese once they have come out on the West Bengal plain, where they would only have to advance about 20 miles in order to cut India's supply corridor to NEFA. Therefore the Bhutanese have the rather strong suspicion that the Chinese made their initial attack on NEFA last year knowing, or planning, that this would lead the Indian Army to an injudicious concentration of their forces in NEFA and Assam, which would make it all the easier for the Chinese to cut them off without much of a fight by simply coming through the Sikkim passes and going down as far as the border of East Pakistan. We ourselves observed how vulnerable that narrow corridor through north Assam is, with only one rail line, one highway and many river crossings (with bridges that could be put out of action); and once the road and the railway had been cut, it would be almost impossible to supply an Army in Assam or NEFA. In that situation

the Indian forces would perhaps have to fight their way back across the spur of East Pakistan in order to rejoin the main body of Indian forces in North Bengal. However, these are speculations. The main point to be made in this report is that the Bhutanese I spoke to do expect a further attack by China, though they do not expect it to be directed against NEFA, Assam, or Bhutan, but to come, as I have said, through East Nepal or Sikkim and to be aimed at the lower Ganges Valley. They think such an attack might come fairly soon, perhaps this spring, especially if Mr. Nehru is unable to carry on, and there is confusion in India over the succession.

9. Relations between Bhutan and both India and the United States are not as good as one would expect in this political perspective, nor are Bhutan's relations with China quite as bad as I had supposed they would be. I was given some interesting explanations for this state of affairs.

Relations with India

10. Relations with India are difficult for a variety of reasons, but I think mainly because the Indians are already in Bhutan and therefore there are opportunities for daily friction that do not occur with the Chinese, who have kept their distance in spite of earlier threats about the "five fingers of Tibet" that I have mentioned, and have not in fact disturbed Bhutanese territorial integrity at any time. The stories given out in Delhi about the Chinese armies having cut through Northern Bhutan on their way into NEFA are flatly denied by the Bhutanese, who regard them as fabrications of the Indians probably intended to cover up part of the ignominy of their defeat.

11. The Bhutanese know of course that they depend on India's help and protection. They know very well that not only their military but their development plans would come to a halt the day that India stopped paying for them; and yet it is perhaps partly this dependence that produces some of the sense of irritation that I encountered in Bhutan with India.

12. The focal point of a good deal of this irritation was the senior Indian adviser, Mr. N[ari]. K. Rustomji [later author of *Enchanted Frontiers: Sikkim, Bhutan and India's North-Eastern Borderland* (1971) and *Bhutan: the Dragon Kingdom in Crisis* (1978)]. Mr. Rustomji enjoys the Prime Minister's confidence, but

perhaps for this very reason a good many leading Bhutanese, including members of the Prime Minister's family, regard him with suspicion. Although he is serving at the request of the Government of Bhutan, and although his role is supposed to be entirely advisory and not executive, he operates as if he was the Chief Minister and not the Government's adviser. That is to say, in his planning commission functions he is placing orders and writing plans and specifications, and so on, without always getting the authority of the Government. When this leads to difficulties, the Prime Minister has, so far, backed him up and told him to go ahead. But this again makes others feel upset. Miss Tashi [Ashi Kesang?] Dorji, the Prime Minister's sister, for example, told me that she and her younger brother, Mr. Lhandup [?] Dorji, who is Secretary-General of the Planning Commission, although they admire Mr. Rustomji's energy and devotion, feel that he has been behaving in Bhutan as if he were the Dawan or Chief Minister, of the country. In fact, this is a not unnatural attitude for Mr. Rustomji to take, since only a few years ago he was the Indian Dawan for Sikkim. More recently he was the India agent in NEFA responsible for the Indian Army's adventures north of the McMahon Line that I shall describe now, since they are very much a part of the Government of Bhutan's attitude towards India at present.

Indian Incursions North of the McMahon Line

13. I was told in confidence that the Bhutanese Government has absolutely reliable information from their own scouts who accompanied the Indian Army, and helped to guide them into the Tibetan regions (which the Bhutanese know so much better than the Indians), that in 1958-59-60 the Indian Army made many penetrations into Tibet, into areas that had always been rather loosely administered from Lhasa but which were definitely north of the McMahon Line. I was told, for example, of one particular operation (under the direction of Mr. Rustomji, as far as the civil authority was concerned) in which the Indian Army went a distance which was described as "ten days' trek by mule" — in other words, perhaps a zig-zag hundred miles — north of the McMahon Line in the NEFA region, and conducted operations against tribals who have been

harassing Indian pilgrims in that area for many years. The object of the operation was apparently to capture or destroy Chinese agents and administrators who the Indians thought, from intelligence sources, were in control of the area. They therefore came in with several hundred men of the Indian Army, and when the tribals hid in the hills the Indians cut off all their food supplies for a couple of weeks. They then dropped salt and rations by parachute into the area and when the tribals came out to get the food they were indiscriminately machine-gunned by the Indian Army, with the result that about four hundred of the tribals perished. Their leader, however, escaped to Lhasa and he was not surprisingly among the scouts who guided the Chinese forces into the NEFA in October 1962.

14. These stories of Indian Army atrocities against the Tibetans carry a lot of weight in Bhutan because the people are cousins of the Tibetans, they write Tibetan, and they speak a dialect of Tibetan. So they really share the sense of outrage that the Tibetans themselves feel when they hear stories such as I have just recounted. Of course there are much worse atrocity stories of what the Chinese have perpetrated against the Tibetans, especially amongst the monasteries, and this is all the more shocking because the Bhutanese are a deeply religious people. But they expect more of the Indians than they do of the Chinese, and therefore the effect of these stories contributes to the surprisingly widespread feeling which I encountered that the Indians are necessary for them but are not all that welcome.

Indian Aid on Paper

15. No doubt there are economic reasons for this feeling also. The Indian merchants have begun to send in cheap cloth in competition with Bhutanese handlooms. The shops that are beginning to come up (in a country that had no shops until the roads went through) are mostly run by Indians and Nepalese. Then at the Government level, as I shall explain in greater detail when discussing their economic development problems, there is a certain feeling that, although the Indians have promised a great deal of aid for economic development, all they have really done so far is to build the roads and write a lot of economic development plans which require a hundred or so Indian experts in the country. And

that, too, is a sort of minor irritant in their relations. Expectations have been raised that are not being fulfilled as quickly as the Bhutanese had hoped, and these hopes are therefore turning a little sour.

Relations with the United States

16. Nor can I report that relations between Bhutan and the United States are really much better. This seems to be mainly because the Americans, in their official dealings with Bhutan through the Embassy in New Delhi, have been almost too careful to avoid anything that the Indian Government might not favour. This was understandable enough at the time the Bhutanese Prime Minister, Mr. Jigme [Palden] Dorji, was trying to get arms from the Americans in New Delhi when India was being attacked by China, but it is less understandable and excusable to the Bhutanese today. When Mr. Dorji called on Mr. [John Kenneth] Galbraith [Ambassador of the United States to India, March 1961 to July 1963] in New Delhi in October 1962, he explained the defence requirements of Bhutan — how they wanted arms desperately to give them a chance to give a good account of themselves if they were attacked, how they had even spontaneously offered India free access to their country with whatever forces the Indian Army wished to send in, in spite of the risks involved in the circumstances to the territorial integrity of Bhutan. All that Mr. Galbraith was able to tell Mr. Dorji at that time was that he thought it was better for India to continue to supply Bhutan with whatever arms could be spared; Bhutan should retain a neutral posture as far as possible, and if the Chinese did come in, Mr. Galbraith concluded, “the Bhutanese would have the sympathy of the whole world”. Mr. Dorji was furious — furious because he wanted a chance to fight the Chinese on at least possible terms if they did come, and he was being told to be neutral and expect the sympathy of the world for their corpse. This line was all the more galling to the Prime Minister because of the background, which perhaps Mr. Galbraith himself did not know. [There is an account of this and a later encounter with Dorji in Galbraith’s *Ambassador’s Journal: A Personal Account of the Kennedy Years* (1969)]

CIA Deal Falls Through

17. While the American Embassy in Delhi was discreetly fending off contacts with the Bhutanese, for the

sake of their more important relations with India, the CIA in Calcutta had, in the years 1959–1962, been in secret contact with the trade representatives of Bhutan in Calcutta, with Miss Tashi Dorji and with the Prime Minister himself. Through these channels the CIA said to Bhutan, in effect, that they wanted (without upsetting the Indians) to have closer relations with Bhutan. They hoped Bhutan would maintain its anti-Communist stand and would have nothing to do with the Chinese, and if they fulfilled these expectations of the Americans they could expect from the CIA secret funds for the furtherance of their economic development plans. It was even suggested to Mr. Dorji that he should make arrangements for an economic survey through a Swedish firm that was indicated, and that the CIA would pick up the bill.

18. Mr. Dorji in fact went to Sweden and hired these expensive economic consultants, who came and made a survey, recommending that Bhutan should develop its potential pulp and paper industry. Then the Swedish firm submitted their bill for the equivalent of Rs. [Rupees] 200,000. Instead of settling the account, as they had undertaken to do, the new head of CIA in Calcutta told the Prime Minister that, unless he could undertake that his Government would be more obviously anti-Communist than it had been in the recent past, the CIA saw no reason to subsidise them in the way which had been discussed. Mr. Dorji, in reply, said that he thought it would be an unwise policy for Bhutan to be more openly and even provocatively anti-Communist than they already were, and that if Bhutan’s present policy was not good enough for the CIA, they could lump it. The Swedish bill has still not been paid, although Miss Dorji told me that the Government have undertaken to pay it off in instalments in rupees, which is of course unsatisfactory to the Swedish consultants.

19. I suppose there is, in addition, a great deal in the American way of life which quite unconsciously offends the traditional attitudes and susceptibilities of a people who have been sheltered for so many centuries as the Bhutanese; and this, together with the background I have given, may account for the otherwise remarkable statement made to me by the Quartermaster-General of Paro, who had been the Bhutanese repre-

sentative in Lhasa. He said to me that if Bhutan was slated to be run by outsiders in the future, it would be “better to have the Chinese than the Americans.” I suppose his attitude was that at least the Chinese were Asians and might not disrupt the Bhutanese way of life so violently as the Americans could. Of course this is an illusion, yet I report it as a pointer to the way these border people feel about their neighbours to the north, and their friends to the south, as well as the friends of their friends — the Americans.

Bhutan’s Degree of Independence

20. In discussing Bhutan’s survival and its relations with the Chinese, Indians and Americans I have clearly been making the assumption that Bhutan is an independent state. This is, as the Indians would be quick to point out, overstating the present facts. Bhutan is really in a “grey zone” between full independence and the dependence of an Indian state. As reported in my letter under reference, the Indian High Commissioner here, Mr. Kapur, who ten years ago was the Indian political officer in Sikkim and Bhutan, was of the opinion personally that it would be a mistake for Bhutan to have any official relations with outside countries, except India. He conceded that India itself has sponsored Bhutan’s application for membership in the Colombo Plan in 1962, but he clearly did not think that this should lead to Bhutan receiving aid directly from other countries. His conception was that any aid given to Bhutan should go through the Indian Government. Although his attitude may be out of date, and he told me that he was speaking quite personally, I expect that this is at the back of the minds of most Indians who are dealing with Bhutanese affairs, and helps to account for the reaction they get in Bhutan.

21. The Treaty of [Friendship of] 1949, signed in Darjeeling between India and Bhutan, clearly states — “The Government of India undertake to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan; on its part the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations.” Then follow clauses providing for an annual subsidy for Bhutan of half a million rupees; and statements that there shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the two Governments, and free trade and commerce between

the two territories, except that India will be the sole supplier of arms, ammunition, machinery, warlike material or stores for the strength and welfare of Bhutan; and this whole Treaty, it is said, shall last indefinitely and be terminated or modified only by mutual consent. The terms of the Treaty are based on the earlier Treaty of [Punakha of] 1910 between the United Kingdom and Bhutan.

22. Although the terms of the Treaty state that Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of India on foreign affairs, in fact this is now disputed in Bhutan. They concede only that India has the right to advise them, in spite of the much more specific language of the Treaty I have just quoted. But whatever they may think about the legalities of the situation, the Indians have the good sense not to press Bhutan too hard on the strict interpretation of the Treaty, and to give them a good deal of rope in foreign affairs. The prime example is India's support for Bhutan as a member of the Colombo Plan. The contacts that have followed, including the visits to Bhutan of Colombo Plan officials and of the Australian High Commissioner and the Japanese Ambassador in New Delhi, have for the most part been arranged through Miss Tashi Dorji, but I think I am the first member of the Colombo Plan Council whom she has invited to Bhutan.

23. Her understanding of the real meaning of Bhutan's independence is of course much broader than the interpretation that would be accepted in Delhi. She tells me that the Prime Minister and the Government have no doubt at all that they have every right to talk to representatives of other countries without giving an account of themselves to India, either before or afterwards. As a matter of courtesy they tell India what they are doing in general terms, but not necessarily in detail, and they hope for economic aid directly from other countries who are members of the Colombo Plan.

24. In fact, Miss Dorji told me that her Government are seriously thinking of making some approach to the Commonwealth countries with a view to seeking membership in the Commonwealth. She admitted that this is partly because they could not, in any case, cope with the expenses and complications of membership in the United Nations [Bhutan became a member of the United Nations in 1971, after 3 years as an observer],

yet they feel that they would like to have more direct contacts with other countries than are at present feasible. Therefore they would like to start these broadening contacts with the limited circle of friends in the Commonwealth. One of their people had been in touch with the Secretariat, I believe, at the last Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference, and they would like to develop this possible expansion of their contacts with other countries during the coming year. She even asked me how to go about such an objective, and I told her, of course quite personally, that I thought there should perhaps be contacts first with the Indian Government about the general proposition, and subsequently a letter should be sent by her Government to all Governments of the Commonwealth advising them of Bhutan's intention to seek membership.

25. When I asked her what the Indians would think of such a move, she conceded that they might not like it very much but she thought they were now broad-minded enough not to object. At one time, before the 1949 Treaty had been signed, she told me that there was a strong body of opinion in Delhi that thought Bhutan should accede to the Indian Union, and they wanted to get the Maharajah (now called the King) of Bhutan to accede to India. When this proved out of the question, India had sensibly recognized the situation and even permitted Bhutan to proceed with such acts of national sovereignty as the creation of their own passports (which India has tacitly accepted by putting visas on them) and with a partial system of coinage (although Indian rupees are still the main notes in circulation with small change in Bhutanese coins), and with new Bhutanese postage stamps, which have just been issued (an application for their acceptance has been made to the International Postal Union).

26. All these attributes of sovereignty distinguish Bhutan from Sikkim, which does not possess any of them. The Treaty governing relations between India and Sikkim is quite specific in reserving not only external affairs but also defence for India, and in practice the Chief Minister of Sikkim is the Indian Dewan. Nothing of the sort would be tolerated in Bhutan. Although at present they may accept even quite large numbers of Indian advisers (for

the roads and economic planning), the Bhutanese certainly run their own administration internally.

27. As far as their external status is concerned, while the Bhutanese have in practice been guided by Indian advice in such matters as not having further contacts with China in recent years, and not opening diplomatic relations with (I believe) two Western countries who had been approached by the Bhutanese, still the King of Bhutan was quite specific on his visit to Delhi about two years ago, saying emphatically that "Bhutan is a sovereign, independent state." In line with this thinking, which is certainly supported by public opinion in Bhutan, as expressed in the National Assembly, or Tshogdu, the Prime Minister, Mr. Jigme Dorji, had also a few years ago wished to be associated with Mr. Nehru when he was negotiating on the Himalayan border with Mr. Chou En-Lai [Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China]. However, Mr. Nehru turned down the Bhutanese request and has subsequently managed to keep the Bhutanese from having any official talks with the Chinese on their own.

28. Here again the guiding thread of Bhutan's policy is survival. If they need India's friendship and help, as they obviously do in order to have a fair chance of surviving, then they must as a practical matter accept India's advice and hope that over the years the Indians will allow them gradually more and more rope, as in fact seems to be the case. Although the Treaty with India of 1949 does not specifically pledge India to defend Bhutan if attacked, Mr. Nehru has done so in no uncertain terms in 1959 and 1960, and that pledge is regarded by the Government of Bhutan as sufficient for their present purposes.

29. Apart from the question of survival and the relations of Bhutan with its neighbours and with other countries, the great question for the Government of Bhutan is of course economic development. However, as the defence and political sections of this report have already made it longer than I had intended, I shall send you a separate letter on Bhutan's economic development.

James George,
High Commissioner



by Roger Lucy

Virgil's *Aeneid* describes the epic adventures of a group of Trojan boat people, who escaped the fall of Troy and, after many adventures and vicissitudes (including a sojourn at Carthage — where Aeneas' jilting of Carthage's queen, Dido, soured Roman-Carthaginian relations for the next millennium) founded a new realm in Italy. It instantly became the official foundation myth of the Roman Empire and the core of the Latin literary canon. Despite the Trojans' trials and tribulations, we know all will work out for the best.

We are hardly into the first Canto, when the goddess Venus promises her son Aeneas that his Roman descendants will enjoy *Imperium sine fine* — unlimited rule — an empire without borders and dominion over all things and peoples. While we may misinterpret what the Gods promise us, they do — unlike politicians — honour their pledges. In Canto 6, Virgil went on to provide what was, in effect, the Roman Empire's "mission statement." Let others, he says, make fine statues, utter noble speeches and chart the course of the stars — casually dismissing the accomplishments of the Greeks of "old Europe." Romans have been given the right to rule (*Imperium*) over the peoples of the world — indeed this is their particular "art" — to impose peace, order, and good government and "...to spare the submissive and to humble the proud."

When Virgil was writing, in the early decades of Augustus' long reign, *Imperium sine fine* seemed very possible. Over the previous two centuries, Roman rule had spread from the Italian peninsula to embrace the entire Mediterranean basin and beyond. Pompey had taken Rome's eagles to the Caspian and the Caucasus; Augustus' adoptive father Julius Caesar had subdued Gaul and led his troops twice across the Rhine and twice across the

"Ocean" (considered the boundary of the known world) to Britain. Augustus had ended a century of civil warfare, with the annexation of Egypt, the last (and richest) of Hellenistic successor states, to Alexander's empire. He had then rounded off the corners of the Empire, subduing the last pockets of resistance in Spain, the Alps and the Balkans, pushing Roman control to the Danube. Roman geographers believed that there was only a narrow strip of land between the Rhine, the Danube and the "Ocean," and that the Caspian Sea was in fact a gulf of the "Ocean" — it was, therefore, not unrealistic to assume that the Roman *Imperium* would soon embrace all of Europe, leaving only a few offshore islands: Britannia, Hibernia, Scandia and Thule. In Africa, Rome controlled the entire Mediterranean shore. To the south, expeditions had found only endless deserts, a few oases and hostile nomads. It was well known that the equatorial zones beyond were too hot to sustain life.

Under Augustus, Roman expeditionary forces also probed down both sides of the Red Sea, the major route by which spices and silk entered the Empire. Above the Nile cataracts lay the kingdom of Nubia, which maintained many of the traditions of ancient Egypt. The Romans penetrated as far as modern Khartoum, but did not occupy the whole country. Further up the Nile, Roman expeditions found nothing but endless swamp. On the eastern shore lay Arabia — most of it was rightly termed Arabia Deserta, but where the Red Sea met the Indian Ocean lay Arabia Felix (Yemen) where the spices came from. Augustus sent an expedition there. A trip down the Red Sea is arduous at the best of times but the Romans' Nabatean guides, who had no desire to see the spice trade in Roman hands, made it even more so. The Romans returned empty handed. Nonetheless Augustus in his *Res Gestae* proclaimed *At my order and under my auspices, two armies were led at almost the same time into Ethiopia and into Arabia Felix; great forces of the enemy of both races were cut down on the battlefield, and many towns were captured.* Roman ideology made little distinction between direct and indirect rule. Surrender was nice, but token submission sufficed — as far as they were concerned these regions now lay within the *Imperium*.

Roman conquests could be pretty dreadful affairs, but the Romans were skilled at

assimilating conquered territories, particularly if the social and economic structures paralleled their own. The political and economic structure of most Gallic tribes was close enough to the oligarchic city states of the Mediterranean to make that possible and the local elites were strongly attracted to Roman material culture. But Gaul could not Romanize in peace if Germany remained unsubdued. By the time Virgil was finishing the *Aeneid*, the Roman armies were across the Rhine and pushing towards the Elbe.

Free Germany was far less developed than Gaul and most of it was divided into unstable chieftainships; there were no towns or other economic centres, and the economy was subsistence and pre-monetary. While the Romans were soon claiming to have subdued Germany, pacification was by no means complete. Essentially they held a series of permanent bases along the Main and the Lippe from which they made forays into the interior to show the eagles and, as required, "humble the proud." A great pincer movement was planned for AD 6. It would have taken the Army of Germany down the Elbe meeting a similar thrust by the Army of Illyricum coming up from the Danube. The target was the most advanced German state in the region — the Marcomanni. However, before the sweep could be launched the Illyrians revolted and were only subdued after a three-year near genocidal campaign involving ten legions.

Much blame has been heaped on the head of the Roman governor, Varus, for what happened next. Previously Governor of Syria, Varus is usually portrayed as a foppish dilettante who thought he could control Germany by the same methods he had Syria. Actually, ten years earlier, Varus had proved himself a very effective commander in Syria. Faced by an uprising in Judea he had mustered all the troops he could scrape up, had marched to the sound of the catapults and, despite being outnumbered, swiftly crushed the revolt. In the fall of AD 9, Varus was returning to his base on the Lippe, when word came of a revolt in the northwest. Varus' reaction, of course, was to turn his army towards the rebellious region to crush the revolt immediately. Following the advice of Arminius, the native commander of a German auxiliary unit, Varus took a road through the Teutoburger Wald near modern Osnabruck.

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Arminius had, in fact, planned an ambush. Where the route passed between a steep forested hill and a swamp, the Germans had constructed an earthwork several kilometres long, from which they sprang their trap and, in a running fight, hounded three legions — over 20,000 Romans — to extinction. Only a few troops escaped to the safety of the Lippe forts, which were speedily evacuated.

The Romans did not immediately react, as the bulk of their forces were still tied up in the Balkans, exterminating the Illyrians. Augustus was dispirited by the disaster and it was not until his death in AD 14, that his successor Tiberius sent his nephew Germanicus into Germany with a massive force. After three years beating about the German bush, Germanicus recovered Varus' eagles, laid waste to much of Westphalia, and suffered several near disasters (including the loss of much of his fleet). Finally Tiberius decided the game was not worth the candle and Germanicus was cross-posted to Syria. Despite the losses that Germanicus inflicted on the Roman army, his supporters convinced posterity that it was Tiberius' jealousy, not the futility of Germanicus' mission that had led to his recall from Germany.

There was an element of truth in the belief that jealousy prompted Germanicus' recall. In Republican Rome, seeking military glory and conquering new territories was part of the political career path. The aim of every Consul or Proconsul was to conquer new lands and win a Triumph. In the Imperial system, Emperors could not afford to let private citizens compete with them for military glory, and governors who tried to win territory without proper clearance or who were too successful often found themselves facing treason charges. With territorial aggrandizement now an imperial prerogative, and Emperors reluctant to delegate or be absent from Rome for too long a period, the heady pace of expansion that had marked the late Republic slowed considerably. Moreover the army was now a professional one; no longer were legions raised for a campaign, they were permanently stationed along the frontiers and over time became rooted there. Mustering large forces for a major campaign became increasingly difficult, and potentially dangerous, as gaps in the defences could be exploited, or troops might revolt if sent far from their homes and families.

Teutoburger Wald is often seen as the high-water mark of Roman expansion, and Augustus reportedly urged Tiberius to cease further expansion. In fact, further, if, usually piecemeal, gains were to be made

for the next 200 years, starting with the invasion of Britain in AD 43, followed by a gradual expansion beyond the upper Rhine and the Danube. In the first decade of the second century, Trajan conquered Dacia (modern Romania), and later that century Marcus Aurelius tried to turn most of former Czechoslovakia into the provinces of Marcomannia and Sarmatia. Trajan also annexed the Nabatean kingdom in modern Jordan and northern Saudi Arabia. Well into the third century the Romans continued a gradual advance of their outposts into northern Arabia and North Africa to exercise closer control over the nomads

Mark Anthony, well funded by Cleopatra, tried again. To avoid being caught in the open plains he advanced through the mountains of Armenia; however, the difficult terrain held up his vital siege train. Unable to take key fortresses guarding the entry points to the Iranian plateau, Anthony had to beat a winter retreat, almost as brutal as Napoleon's retreat from Moscow. Caesar too entertained a grand design of leading his armies on a huge sweep across the Danube, around the Black Sea, through the Caucasus and down into Iran. Fortunately for his reputation, the *ides of March* came and Caesar was gone.

Augustus would not have prevailed in a decade-long civil war, nor have reigned another 45 years, if he had not learned from others' mistakes.

beyond. Such advances, however, tended to run out of steam once they started to encompass peoples such as the Germans or the inhabitants of Scotland, who were unamenable to Romanization and whose economies were too underdeveloped to support the garrisons required to occupy them. It was in these areas that Virgil's noble aim of sparing the submissive and humbling the proud was replaced by an approach summarized in Tacitus' famous line: "They made a desolation and called it peace."

Along the Iranian front, however, Rome continued to pursue its aim of conquest from first contact in 92 BC to the final exhaustion of the two empires in AD 629 — surely the longest period of great power confrontation in history. If the Romans were to emulate Alexander and advance to India, they had, like him, to defeat Iran. Modern Iran, Iraq and large parts of the "Stans" were ruled by the Parthians, originally nomads from the region between the Caspian and Aral seas. When the expanding empires of Rome and Parthia first came into contact both had other preoccupations and their respective commanders agreed that the Euphrates should be the boundary between their spheres of influence. To the Romans this was just an interim measure and they were soon probing beyond the Euphrates. The plutocrat senator Marcus Licinius Crassus wished to emulate the military glory won by his fellow triumvirs, Caesar and Pompey. In 53 BC he invaded Iraq with seven legions and quickly lost his entire army, and his life, to the massed firepower of Parthian horse archers and armoured shock cavalry. Twenty years later,

Augustus would not have prevailed in a decade-long civil war, nor have reigned another 45 years, if he had not learned from others' mistakes. He chose not to invade Iran. Instead he made a show of force along the border, at the time when the Parthian Arsacid dynasty was preoccupied with internal problems. The return of the legionary eagles lost by Crassus and Anthony was agreed upon, as was the repatriation of any surviving PoWs who could be located. (Many had been sent to man Parthian garrisons in Central Asia — one group may even have ended up fighting the Chinese.) This Augustus celebrated with great fanfare, as if a military victory had been won. *I compelled the Parthians to give back the spoils and the standards of three Roman armies, and to beg the friendship of the Roman People.* The standards were deposited in the temple of Mars the Avenger and the event commemorated on everything from the coinage to a special triumphal arch. Again token submission was enough, and the Parthian frontier was quiet for the next 80 years. The only flash-point was Armenia. A bitter war fought in Nero's reign led to a compromise whereby it was agreed that the Parthian king would choose the king of Armenia (who indeed came from a cadet branch of the Arsacid family) while Rome confirmed the choice and conferred the royal insignia.

A century after Augustus' death Trajan, fresh from his conquest of Dacia, took advantage of internal dissension in Iran, and a technical violation in the appointment of an Armenian king, to march east, first overrunning Armenia and then invading northern Mesopotamia. The local rulers

in trans-Caucasia, eastern Anatolia and Kurdistan (Gordyene) quickly rallied to his coalition. As Parthian resistance crumbled, Trajan advanced down the Tigris and Euphrates, taking the Parthian capital at Ctesiphon (just south of Baghdad) before pushing on to the Persian Gulf — the first (and last) Roman emperor ever to advance so far. Even as he watched a ship sailing off to India and regretted that, now in his sixties, he was too old to follow, his newly annexed, but scarcely organized, provinces in Iraq erupted behind him. To save his isolated garrisons, Trajan hastily returned sovereignty to Parthia and Armenia, while trying to consolidate a new front, roughly along the present-day Turkish and Syrian borders. At this point, massive and bloody inter-communal fighting between the local Greek and Jewish communities broke out in Cyprus, Egypt and Cyrenica (encouraged by the large Jewish community in Babylon, which had been instrumental in raising the revolt in Iraq). Sick and discouraged, Trajan died in August 117 returning to Rome. His successor Hadrian withdrew the remnants of the Roman garrisons to the upper Euphrates.

Despite this debacle, the lure of Alexander continued to draw Roman armies south and east. From the late second century, endemic conflict with the Parthians allowed the Romans to advance the frontier down the Tigris and Euphrates until it extended roughly from the Mosul area to almost as far south as Fallujah. In AD 224, however, the Parthian Arsacids were overthrown by a new dynasty, the Sassanids, from Fars province, the very heart of Iran. Claiming a somewhat shaky descent from the Achaemenid kings Darius and Xerxes, they also demanded the return of all the lands the Achaemenids had lost to Alexander 500 years before, including not just Roman Mesopotamia, but Syria, Egypt and Asia Minor as well.

The Sassanids were far better organized and unified than the Arsacids, and came to power at time when the Roman internal situation was becoming increasingly unstable, and when barbarian pressure on the Rhine and Danube was increasing. They inflicted some major defeats on the Romans, stabilizing and to some extent rolling back the frontier, and shifting the focus of great power rivalry out of Mesopotamia and into mountainous zones of Kurdistan, Armenia and Georgia. The Romans were able to recoup some of their losses at the end of the third century, only to lose most of their gains in 363, when Julian the Apostate (another victim of an Alexander complex) embarked on disastrous march on Ctesiphon. Thwarted and

stranded on the wrong side of the Tigris, Julian was mysteriously felled by a spear in a skirmish (probably wielded by one of his own soldiers). To extract the Roman army, his successor, Jovian, had to concede key strong points and territories. Julian was one of the last rulers of an undivided Roman Empire — never again could the whole weight of Roman power be directed against Iran.

For the next century and a half Rome and Iran were too engrossed in warding off barbarian attacks to find the resources to fight each other very much. Accommodation was reached over Armenia — effectively Rome and Iran partitioned and annexed the kingdom, and the Romans agreed to subsidize the Iranian defence of the Caucasian passes against nomad attacks (they did not always pay up). The two sides also agreed to restrain their respective Arab allies from raiding the other's territories in peacetime.

Unfortunately this period of detente broke down in the first decades of the sixth century to be followed by an almost continual and escalating series of wars that lasted

Khushru, confident the restoration of Iran's Achaemenid glories was at hand, rebuffed the Roman peace overtures and put the Roman envoys to death.


Imperium sine fine had shrunk to the confines of Constantinople and a few littoral stretches of Anatolia, the Balkans and the West. Emperor Heraclius, like his distant predecessor Aeneas almost two thousand years before, contemplated abandoning the shores of the Sea of Marmora to recoup his fortunes in North Africa and Italy. While Carthage and Rome still remained under Roman control, the fall of Constantinople to the Iranians in AD 626 would have made today's world an utterly different place. Instead Heraclius redeployed the remains of the Roman field armies in northeast Anatolia, and, allied with the Turkish Khazars, struck south and east through Azerbaijan, advancing down through Kurdistan to inflict a decisive defeat on the Iranians outside Mosul. Heraclius marched on Ctesiphon, Khushru was overthrown in a palace coup and in 629 his successor agreed to a peace based on the *status quo ante*.

Despite this debacle, the lure of Alexander continued to draw Roman armies south and east.

for the next century. The main theatres of war were the heavily fortified cities of the upper Euphrates and Tigris, but fighting also took place in Armenia and Georgia, along the desert frontiers of Syria and Arabia and, through the use of Arab and Abyssinian proxies, down into the Hejaz and Yemen. The Romans were largely preoccupied with reconquering Italy, North Africa and Spain, which had been lost to the barbarians in the previous century and with defending the Balkans from nomad incursions. Persian raids in the mid and late sixth century devastated Antioch, Apamea and other great cities of northern Syria, and increasingly the two empires relied on Arab auxiliaries to defend the desert flanks of their empires. In 591 Roman intervention in an Iranian civil war placed Khushru II on the throne in exchange for significant territorial concessions in Armenia. When Khushru's Roman patron, Maurice, was overthrown in 602, Khushru exploited the ensuing period of instability and civil war, overrunning Syria, Palestine, much of Anatolia and finally Egypt. The Slavs and Avars overran the Balkans and with the Iranians besieged Constantinople.

The Romans had survived their worst crisis since the time of Hannibal, but almost 30 years of war, the occupation of their richest provinces and devastation of what remained left them exhausted and unable to respond when five years later the Islamic *conquista* began. Syria, Egypt and North Africa were lost. Anatolia was held, but barely, and twice more in the next century, Constantinople was to be besieged. The Iranians fared less well; the Sassanid empire was lost entirely. Known to us now as Byzantium, the Roman empire survived another 800 years, but *Imperium sine fine* was now something to be pursued on the spiritual, not the temporal plane. ☸

Roger Lucy has recently retired after 33 years with External Affairs. He served in Chicago, Tehran, Oslo and Port of Spain. He has contributed several previous articles on "Dark Age Diplomacy," two of which have been awarded prizes by the Retired Heads of Mission Association (RHOMA). Questions or comments about this or other articles can be directed to him at galea.hortus@sympatico.ca



THE HUNT FOR FRED OCTOBER



Ludwig and Esmeralda sipped Turkish coffee in a shadowy corner of the Blue Parrot, watching its owner, Ferrari, negotiate the purchase of the Café Américain from Rick Blaine. As always, Bogart played Blaine with nicely mingled comradery and distrust, but Ferrari was having problems. His fez kept falling off and he kept missing the drowsy bluebottle on the tabletop. Finally, he dropped the fly swatter, pulled out a revolver and fired. His shot blasted a hole in the table, drilled his fez, exploded his glass of arak and (on the ricochet) cracked an ugly ceramic elephant behind the bar. The fly buzzed off. Bogart raised an eyebrow but continued the scene unruffled. "Don Gordo is a poor substitute for Sidney Greenstreet, in all but girth," said Liebnitz. "It's good we're pulling him out once the scene is over, or *Casablanca* might never recover."



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His colleague put down her cup and said, "I still don't understand what's going on. One minute I'm having lunch in the cafeteria, the next I'm in front of a Paris cathedral, in medieval drag, with a corpse at my feet. I catch sight of Rialto Sleazewagon dressed as a monk. He looks up at the bell tower and says, 'The hunchback's apprentice. I don't know his name, but he's a dead ringer for Quasimodo.' Then he vanishes. But that isn't the end of my problems. I find myself compelled to act the role of a floozy in some Dark Age flick. When the final credits roll, I wake up in a vast corridor with films projected on the walls — and I'm in all of them. I wander for hours, but there's no way out. Finally, in front of a screen showing a Western, I put my hand out and get sucked into the film, playing opposite John Wayne. Then you show up. What gives?"

"You remember the drive to digitise old movies?" asked the ace logician. "Every film ever made is now on some server. Rialto Sleazewagon has been ripping them all off — not just copying the movie but deleting the original and every copy he can find, putting the stolen versions on a mainframe in Crawford, Texas. If he isn't stopped, he'll have the only versions left and can charge the moon to see them. That might not be so bad for *Attack of the Killer Tomatoes* or *The Terror of Tiny Town*, but a lot of classics would get swallowed up too."

"But where do I come in?" Esmeralda asked. Liebnitz went on, "Bugbyte O'Nanotek discovered Sleazewagon's plot when she tried to download *Priscilla, Queen of the Desert* and found it had vanished. She back-traced the theft to his mainframe and was going to crash it and restore the originals, but she tripped an alarm and he struck before she could act. You know the way they can digitise real people and inject them into a new movie these days? Well, Sleazewagon's researchers have worked out a way to delete real people and transfer them digitally into old movies. He slotted three Centre agents into existing roles to bind them into the system. You replaced Maureen O'Hara as Esmeralda (very Sleazewagon, that) in *The Hunchback of Notre Dame*, for example. Don Gordo replaced Sidney Greenstreet in *Casablanca*. If Bugbyte executed her program, all trace of your reality would

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disappear when the mainframe went down. Sleazewagon thought he had us check-mated."

"But he underestimated Bugbyte. She found a way to get me into the mainframe and to let me move around there. Sleazewagon hasn't realised that the database has begun to create its own reality. He never planned those cine-corridors, for example. One set exists for every actor in films, the walls displaying every film they appeared in. As you found out, the actor can exit from a film into the corridor and then go into another film. And others can be taken along if they are close enough. In your second 'role', you took O'Hara's place in *The Quiet Man*, where Bugbyte found you. From there, you'll recall, we followed Ward Bond through his corridors into *The Maltese Falcon*, where we linked up with Peter Lorre. He in turn took us to *Casablanca*. As soon as Don Gordo finishes this scene with Bogart, we'll link up with Captain Renault."

And so it went. Claude Rains, switching from Renault to the Machiavellian Mr Dryden, took them into *Lawrence of Arabia*, where they hooked up with Alec Guinness (playing Prince Feisal), who in turn moved them into *Star Wars*. "Obi-Wan Kenobi is far from my favourite role," he said as they strode up to a spaceport bar, "but Sleazewagon has to be stopped." Don Gordo agreed. "I myself am a big fan of *The Terror of Tiny Town* — what's not to like about an all-midget musical Western?"

A loud crash erupted from the doorway of the bar, followed by several customers, some upright. The outsiders entered, to see a blond figure in white swing across the room on a snake-headed chandelier

inches ahead of a mob of two-foot, six-headed eggplants. Mistiming his landing, he somersaulted into the bottle cabinet, spreading broken glass and potent liquor across the room. Emerging, he drew a light-sabre, igniting the alcoholic vapours around a shaggy three-legged creature in grey. Fortunately, the creature was an asbestos-based life form. Unfortunately, being set on fire initiated his mating ritual. Stooping, he embraced the eggplants and began the timeless celebration of the *aubergines flambées*. The figure in white tripped over an iron cockroach and fell into what seemed to be a Jacuzzi full of guacamole, with eyestalks. Guinness murmured dryly, "I see that young Skywalker has gone over to the dork side of the farce."

"No, it's just Manitoba Jones," sighed Liebnitz, helping his agent out of the hot-tub (not without lingering glances from the guacamole) and turning to his companions. "With all hostages rescued, we follow Bugbyte's instructions to the one film in the database from which we can exit the mainframe. She couldn't give me final instructions before I left the Centre, but she told me to get through the cine-corridors to Zeffereilli's *Romeo and Juliet*, where she'd contact me." There followed a blur of cuts that would have taxed the best film editor. Following Harrison Ford from *Star Wars* to *Apocalypse Now*, they picked up Robert Duvall (smelling of napalm and humming Wagner) for a transfer to *The Godfather*, then linked up with James Caan to shift to *A Bridge Too Far*. Lawrence Olivier took them into *Romeo and Juliet* ("Not *my* Romeo, you understand, but they still wanted my voice."). There the outsiders gathered in the arcade edging the

Verona piazza where Tybalt and Benvolio were lighting the fuse for the fireworks to come.

"Right," said Liebnitz. "Now we have to find Bugbyte's message." "You mean you don't know where it is?" asked Esmeralda. The ace logician looked abashed. "We worked this on the fly. All I know is to find a messenger. The set-up cannot change the film's plot and the message can't be explicitly for us, or it will be picked up by the intrusion detection software. Ideas, anyone?" Esmeralda put her head on one side. "Toward the end, doesn't Friar Laurence send a letter to Romeo in Mantua, to explain his absurdly complicated 'Juliet isn't really dead' plot?" Manitoba Jones nodded. "But the messenger never delivers the letter, which is why things get messy at the tomb. He claims he got shut up in a house by mistake, but that has always seemed a weak story." Liebnitz stroked his chin. "Yes, it has. I think we can work with it."

Exiting with the rest of the crowd, the outsiders reassembled later near Friar Laurence's cell. A cowed figure hurried out of the lighted doorway, calling back that he would haste to Mantua. As he rounded the corner, Esmeralda caught his eye (Esmeralda was the eye-catching sort) while Don Gordo and Manitoba Jones slipped a large sack over his head and carted him off, first handing over his shoulder pouch. Liebnitz opened it and unfolded the manuscript inside. "Bugbyte's come though," he said. "This puzzle will tell us how to get out of here. Let's work on it while Don Gordo coaches Friar John." The message read as follows.

The following 25 clues refer to altered movie titles — altered by changing one word only, by adding/subtracting/changing a letter or two, or by substituting a rhyming word. The data in parenthesis after each clue give hints to the original movie titles — a featured actor plus the year of release. For example, a clue reading "*Gretzky bio-pic trilogy with hobbits (Viggo Mortensen 2001–2003)*" would lead to *Lord of the Rings*. The clues are listed so that the altered words come out in alphabetical order.

Liebnitz and Esmeralda quickly worked out the 25 answers. Liebnitz then pointed out the faint lettering on



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|---|--|
| (1) Hemingway student switches faculty from sciences (Gary Cooper 1932) | (13) <i>Belle époque</i> singer invents cantaloup-based face powder (Nicole Kidman 2001) |
| (2) Scottish assent for automation (Will Smith 2004) | (14) Woody Allen films facial evidence of an Egyptian drunk (Mia Farrow 1984) |
| (3) Baroque composer reaches tomorrow (Michael J Fox 1985) | (15) Nick the Greek bio-pic, not set in Kansas (Judy Garland 1939) |
| (4) Tough New York cop investigates a <i>pâtisserie</i> (Gene Hackman 1971) | (16) Black sheriff wins hot kayak race (Mel Brooks 1974) |
| (5) Tough San Francisco cop with a nice line in light tunes (Clint Eastwood 1971) | (17) Motion-sick motorcycle tripper (Peter Fonda 1969) |
| (6) Okies reach California, succeed in interior decor (Henry Fonda 1940) | (18) They weren't working, so Noah couldn't find the way (Harrison Ford 1981) |
| (7) Dickensian lad wins long-distance spitting contest (John Mills 1946) | (19) Futuristic masseur uses a knife (Harrison Ford 1982) |
| (8) Platonic ideal of a tempest (George Clooney 2000) | (20) Little Bo Peep searches the latte bars of Puget Sound (Tom Hanks 1993) |
| (9) High-spirited Hellenic computer guy (Anthony Quinn 1964) | (21) Newfoundland's leading journal of tea (Kevin Spacey 2002) |
| (10) Toothless attack on a Nazi island fortress (Gregory Peck 1961) | (22) Seduction of a kitchen appliance (Michael Douglas 1984) |
| (11) Rocker from a 60s group rules Thailand with help (Yul Brynner 1956) | (23) What an up-to-date fork has (Charlie Chaplin 1936) |
| (12) Captain Nemo's sub has many problems (Kirk Douglas 1954) | (24) Difficult students in prohibition Chicago (Kevin Costner 1987) |
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
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
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
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